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FINANCIAL ADVICE IN AUSTRALIA:
PRINCIPLES TO PROSCRIPTION;
MANAGING TO BANNING
RICHARD BATTEN† AND GAIL PEARSON‡
Australia has put in place a new regulatory system for
providing advice that modifies existing obligations and
introduces new requirements. The three planks of the new
regime are as follows: (1) a statutory obligation that advisers act
in the best interests of the client and, in the case of any conflict,
give priority to the interests of the client; (2) a ban on conflicted
remuneration; and (3) new arrangements for ongoing fees that
require the client to opt-in. This new regime is found in
consumer protection legislation which does not generally apply
directly to commercial relationships and wholesale clients. It is
changing financial planners’ conduct of business and particularly
their remuneration models. Whether it will lead to readily
available, properly priced, better advice from trusted financial
planners can only be assessed in the future. The changes to the
remuneration and fee rules are more likely to drive change and
have a bigger impact than the reworked appropriate advice rules.
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This Article contains parallel citations in the Australian format of legal citation to
ensure that Australian practitioners can easily access the cited sources. The editors
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St. John’s Law Review is unfamiliar with the Australian method of legal citation, the
editors cannot assert that the form of parallel citation is technically accurate.
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FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE

Financial advice is vital due to the compulsory
superannuation system in Australia.1 By law, superannuation
funds are trusts.2 There is choice of fund, for profit and not-forprofit funds, self-managed superannuation funds, and payouts of
large lump sums. Individuals also use financial advisers to
access managed funds. The policy and regulatory vision is that
individuals should be responsible for market risk,3 though there
are caveats to this policy.
Australian financial services
regulation distinguishes between retail clients and others.4
There are extensive protections specifically for retail clients.5 In
addition, policy makers and regulators recognize two factors—
limited financial literacy and individual decision-making biases.6
One solution is to encourage retail clients to use professional
advisers. However, certain commentators believe this solution is

1
At the end of 2011 the industry managed 1.4 trillion AUD. AUSTRALIAN GOV’T,
STRONGER SUPER: INFORMATION PACK, at v (2011). {Treasury, Stronger Super
Information Pack (21 September 2011) v.} The Productivity Commission estimated
this at 1.3 trillion AUD and as equivalent to Australia’s gross domestic product
(“GDP”); it is expected that by 2040 this will be 150% of Australia’s GDP.
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION DRAFT
REPORT: DEFAULT SUPERANNUATION FUNDS IN MODERN AWARDS 27 (2012).
{Australian Government
Productivity Commission, Draft Report—Default
Superannuation Funds in Modern Awards (June 2012) 27f.} The superannuation
system is linked to recognizing incentives to save for retirement as Australia does
not have a universal pension system.
2
See, e.g., Daniel Mendoza-Jones, Superannuation Trustees: Governance, Best
Interests, Conflicts of Interest and the Proposed Reforms, 30 COMPANY & SEC. L.J.
297, 298 (2012). {See, for example, Daniel Mendoza-Jones, ‘Superannuation
Trustees: Governance, Best Interests, Conflicts of Interest and the Proposed
Reforms’ (2012) 30 Company and Securities Law Journal 297.}
3
For a summary of the question of where the responsibility should lie, see
Dimity Kingsford Smith, ASIC Regulation for the Investor as Consumer, 29
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 327, 353 (2011) {see D Kingsford-Smith, ‘ASIC Regulation for
the Investor as Consumer’ (2011) 29 Company and Securities Law Journal 327, 353}.
4
See generally Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 7 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) Chapter 7.} Section 761 defines providing a financial service to a retail client.
Id. s 761G. {Ibid s 761G.}
5
These protections include extensive disclosure about providers and issuers,
products and advice in financial services guides, product disclosure statements, and
statements of advice; market conduct rules, and availability of compensation.
6
See AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4. {Australian
Government Productivity Commission, Draft Report, above n 1, 4.}
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contradicted by evidence of advice being given without a
reasonable basis for that advice,7 conflicted remuneration,8 and
losses so significant they led to a Parliamentary inquiry.9
This inquiry identified a number of areas of concern over the
regulation of financial services, including the inadequacy of
disclosure and conduct standards, the competency requirements
for licensees, and the need for enhanced enforcement. The
inquiry recommended changes to regulation of the advice
industry, including an explicit legislative fiduciary duty and
more targeted financial literacy programs.10 The committee
noted that remuneration within the industry was incompatible
with a fiduciary duty. It proposed that government should
consult on strategies to remove commissions and, in particular,
recommended an end to payments from financial product
manufacturers to financial advisers.11 The key idea was that by
eliminating commissions and finding a way to ensure advisers

7
In a shadow shopping exercise published in 2012, the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) found that thirty-nine percent of the sample
did not meet the legislative requirement to have a reasonable basis for the advice
and the standard of “appropriate.” AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 279,
SHADOW SHOPPING STUDY OF RETIREMENT ADVICE 31–33 (2012). {Australian
Securities and Investments Commission, Shadow Shopping Study of Retirement
Advice, Report 279 (March 2012) 31, 33.} On the role that financial advisers played
in the high profile collapses of Storm Financial and Opes Prime, see
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON CORPS. & FIN. SERVS., INQUIRY INTO FINANCIAL
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA 19–67 (2009) [hereinafter RIPOLL REPORT],
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/fps/
report/report.pdf {Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial
Services, Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia (‘Ripoll Report’)
(November 2009) Chapters 3–4 at http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/
corporations_ctte/fps/report/report.pdf}.
8
See Gerard Craddock, The Ripoll Committee Recommendation for a Fiduciary
Duty in the Broader Regulatory Context, 30 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 216, 216–19 (2012)
{Gerard Craddock, SC, ‘The Ripoll Committee Recommendation for a Fiduciary Duty
in the Broader Regulatory Context’ (2012) 30 Company and Securities Law Journal
216, 216–9}, for a statement of the problem of conflicted remuneration particularly
as revealed through statements in the Financial Services Guides of financial
planners. The Financial Services Guide is a mandatory disclosure document that
must be given by financial services licensees to retail clients. Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 941A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 941A.}
9
See generally RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7. {Ripoll Report, above n 7.}
10
See id. at 100–01, 105–06, 150. {Ibid.} For recommended changes to fiduciary
duty, see id. at 103–06, 150 {Ripoll Report Recommendation 1, 150, 103f, 110f}. For
recommendations regarding financial literacy programs, see id. at 147, 151
{Recommendation 11, 151, 147}.
11
Id. at 127, 151. {Ibid Recommendation 4, 127, 151.}
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put the interests of the client first, Australians would get better
advice and would not be led into the types of investment schemes
that set off the inquiry.
The new Future of Financial Advice (“FOFA”) rules do not
specifically define the adviser relationship as fiduciary. They
have several components: (1) to act in the best interests of the
client;12 (2) to follow prescribed steps to meet the best interests
obligation;13 (3) to reach and give appropriate advice through
meeting the best interests obligation;14 (4) in case of a conflict of
interest, to give priority to the interests of the client;15 (5) to ban
conflicted remuneration, volume-based benefits, shelf fees, and
asset-based fees on borrowed monies;16 and (6) to require that
every two years, clients must opt-in to any ongoing fee
arrangement.17
The first four obligations are linked and
generally fall on individuals.18 The remuneration rules are not
restricted to individuals.19
A.

Relationship to Previous Rules

This new legislation modifies the largely principles-based
rules of Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act, which date from 2001
and protect retail clients of financial services.
The new
legislation contains some completely new rules, replaces others,
and retains many. The rules apply to personal advice given to a
retail client.20
The replaced rules also required financial services licensees
to give only “appropriate advice.” Under these rules, licensees
had to determine the relevant personal circumstance of the
client; make reasonable inquiries of those circumstances; with
regard to the information obtained from the client, consider the
subject matter of the advice and undertake a reasonable

12
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(1) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 961B(1).}
13
Id. s 961B(2). {Ibid s 961B(2).}
14
Id. s 961G. {Ibid s 961G.}
15
Id. s 961J. {Ibid s 961J.}
16
Id. ss 963E, 964A, 964D. {Ibid ss 963E, 964A, 964D.}
17
Id. ss 962K, 962L. {Ibid ss 962K, 962L.}
18
Id. s 961. {Ibid s 961.} The obligation may fall on a company where it is not
possible to identify an individual provider and where advice is given through a
computer. See id. s 961(5), (6). {Ibid s 961(5), (6).}
19
See, e.g., id. s 963A. {See, for example, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963A.}
20
Id. ss 766B(3), 761G. {Ibid ss 766B(3), 761G.}
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investigation of the subject matter of the advice; and, with regard
to the consideration and the investigation, give “appropriate”
advice.21 Clients were given a warning if advice was based on
incomplete or inaccurate information.22 Any such warning was
given in the mandatory “Statement of Advice.”23 The rules
required and still require licensees to have “adequate
arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest.”24
21
Id. s 945A (repealed 2012). {Ibid s 945A (repealed).} In Nguyen v Australian
Sec. & Invs. Comm’n [2012] AATA 156, ¶¶ 36–39, 59, 92 (Austl.) {Nguyen v
Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] AATA 156}, a financial
adviser with Colonial First State, a subsidiary of the Commonwealth Bank of
Australia, was banned for, among other things, a contravention of section 945A by
failing to formulate appropriate advice and switching an eighty-three-year-old
woman out of a safe wholesale income fund into an international property trust and
a wholesale property securities investment that was higher risk and more volatile
than fixed interest assets. According to AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N,
REGULATORY GUIDE 175, LICENSING: FINANCIAL PRODUCT ADVISERS—CONDUCT
AND DISCLOSURE 7 (2011) [hereinafter ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175] {Note
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Licensing: Financial Product
Advisers — Conduct and Disclosure, Regulatory Guide 175, April 2011 (‘ASIC
Regulatory Guide 175’) at 175}, 175.16 provided that (a) the providing entity must
“make reasonable inquiries about the client’s relevant personal circumstances”;
(b) the providing entity must “consider and investigate the subject matter of the
advice” as is reasonable in all the circumstances; and (c) the advice must be
“appropriate” for the client. Also, 175.122 required consideration of the potential
impact of inappropriate advice on the client, complexity of the advice, and financial
literacy of the client. ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra, at 36. To ascertain the
circumstances of the client, 175.125 required looking at the client’s (a) need for
regular income—for example, retirement income; (b) need for capital growth;
(c) desire to minimize fees and costs; (d) tolerance of the risk of capital loss,
especially where this is a significant possibility if the advice is followed; (e) tolerance
of the risk that the advice, if followed, will not produce the expected benefits;
(f) existing investment portfolio; (g) need to be able to readily cash-in the
investment; (h) capacity to service any loan provided in relation to a financial
product; and (i) tax position, social security entitlements, family commitments,
employment security, and expected retirement age. Id. at 37. This 2011 Regulatory
Guide updated earlier versions and has itself been updated in December 2012 and
October 2013.
22
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 945B (Austl.) (repealed 2012). {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) s 945B (repealed).}
23
Id. ss 947B–947C. {Ibid ss 947B (amended), 947C (amended).}
24
Id. s 912A. {Ibid s 912A.} This obligation is a condition of holding an
Australian Financial Services Licence. See id. s 912A(1)(aa). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 912A 1(aa).} For a discussion on the management of conflicts of duty and
interest, see generally AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REGULATORY GUIDE 181,
LICENSING: MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2004) {Australian Securities and
Investments Commission, Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest, Regulatory
Guide 181 (‘ASIC Regulatory Guide 181’)}; AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
AUTH., PRUDENTIAL PRACTICE GUIDE DRAFT: SPG 521—CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
(2012) {Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Prudential Practice Guide Draft
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Licensees must disclose information about relationships with
others reasonably expected to be capable of influencing the
providing entity in providing the service25 and must also provide
information about remuneration, including commissions or other
benefits.26
Previously there was a criminal sanction for contravention of
the pre-existing statutory “appropriate advice” prohibition.27
Now, a contravention of the best interests and client priority
rules may result in a civil penalty, an order to compensate the
client for loss or damage, restitution, and an order declaring the
contract void.28
All contracts for the provision of financial services to a
consumer still contain an implied non-excludable term that the
services will be rendered with due care and skill, and, if the
consumer expressly or impliedly makes known the purpose or
desired results to the person who supplied the service, the
services will be fit for that purpose or shall be of such quality to
reasonably achieve that result.29
The new legislation addresses some of the problems inherent
in the confusion between sales and advice30 but will not
necessarily ensure suitable or the best quality advice.31 It may
SPG 521 — Conflicts of Interest (April 2012)}. Inability to recognize a conflict of
interest goes to suitability to hold a financial services license. Kofkin v. Australian
Cos. & Sec. Comm’n [2009] AATA 660, ¶ 54 (Austl.). {Kofkin v Australian Companies
and Securities Commission [2009] AATA 660 at [54].} The view that disclosure has
been inadequate to manage conflicts of interest informed the Ripoll Report which
preceded the FOFA legislation. RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 111–12. {Ripoll
Report, above n 7, 111–2.}
25
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 942B(2)(f) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 942B(2)(f).}
26
Id. s 942B(2)(e). {Ibid s 942B(2)(e).}
27
Id. ss 945A (repealed 2012), 1311(1). {Ibid s 945A (repealed); s 1311(1).}
28
Id. ss 961K, 961M, 961N. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 961K, 961M, 961N.}
29
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12ED (Austl.).
{Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12 ED.}
30
GAIL PEARSON, FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW AND COMPLIANCE IN AUSTRALIA
200 (2009). {G Pearson, Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 200.} The Ripoll Report subsequently asked if
advice about financial products was a sales industry or an advice industry and noted
that consumers cannot discern if planners are simply sales agents or independent
advisers. RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 69, 83. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 69, 83.}
31
Note ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra note 21, at 34–35 {ASIC
Regulatory Guide 175, above n 21}, which in 175.113 referred to Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) s 945A (Austl.) (repealed 2012) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 945A
(repealed)} as a suitability rule, and also in 175.117, said that the advice does not
have to be ideal, perfect, or best. Yet ASIC proposes that “it would be reasonable to
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limit some conflicts and will alter some remuneration practices.
FOFA is attributed with altering the structure of the advice
industry.32 In some respects it may be no more, and perhaps
even less, protective than legislation it has replaced.
B.

Availability of Financial Advice

As well as improving the quality of advice, a declared
purpose of the new framework is to improve access to financial
advice.33 This purpose is consistent with regulatory objectives to
promote confident and informed participation and decisionconclude that advice is appropriate if: (a) it is fit for its purpose—that is, following
the advice is likely to satisfy the client’s relevant circumstances; and (b) following
the advice is likely to leave the client in a better position.” AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS.
COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER 182, FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE: BEST
INTERESTS DUTY AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS—UPDATE TO RG 175, at 19 (2012)
[hereinafter ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182] (emphasis added). {Australian
Securities and Investments Commission, Future of Financial Advice: Best Interests
Duty and Related Obligations — Update to RG 175, Consultation Paper 182, 9
August 2012 (‘ASIC Consultation Paper 182’) 19.}
32
The industry is consolidating through mergers and acquisitions; more dealer
groups have become aligned with the big four banks while boutique firms remain,
resulting in fewer independent groups. Ruth Liew, Mergers Squeeze Financial
Planner Options, FIN. REV. (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:26 AM), http://www.afr.com/p/
personal_finance/portfolio/mergers_squeeze_financial_planner_LwgrKht7xsMM3AE
BLnBV8O. {Ruth Liew, ‘Mergers Squeeze Planner Options’, Australian Financial
Review (Sydney), 29 August 2012.} This consolidation may signal a move from a
distribution network to an advice network.
33
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further
Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) 3 (Austl.) [hereinafter Further
FOFA
Bill
Revised
Explanatory
Memorandum],
available
at
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legis
lation%2Fems%2Fr4739_ems_c1902f04-f76c-455d-87bf-763755860827%22. {Revised
Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of
Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2012 (‘Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory
Memorandum’) 3 at <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;
query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fems%2Fr4739_ems_c1902f04-f76c-455d-87bf-76375
5860827%22>.} But note that in the Parliament, the Minister stated that while the
legislation would lead to better advice, it was primarily “about regulating conflicts,
not the intrinsic value of the advice provided.” PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON
CORPS. & FIN. SERVS., CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT (FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE)
BILL 2011 AND CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT (FURTHER FUTURE OF FINANCIAL
ADVICE MEASURES) BILL 2011, at 22 (2012) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY JOINT
COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND REPORT]. {Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Corporations and Financial Services, Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial
Advice) Bill 2011 and Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice
Measures) Bill 2011 (February 2012) (‘Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and
Report’) 22.} Many Australians do access financial advice. It was estimated that the
twenty largest licensees had four million clients in 2010, 1.5 million of whom were
considered active. Id. at 2. {Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report, 2.}
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making by consumers.34 The financial services regulator, the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”),
views access to quality advice as part of risk regulation, a way to
reduce risks for consumers and a way to improve market
competition and efficiency.35 ASIC says that, despite high
numbers of planners, there is a gap between the advice
consumers want and the advice which advisers provide.36
Advisers are generally not specialists—although they may have
access to specialists—and either want or feel compelled to
provide comprehensive financial plans for the entirety of a
client’s financial situation; clients often want targeted or “scaled”
advice.37 Advisers work from approved product lists linked to
product platforms but tend to recommend only a few key
products.38

34

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)(b)
(Austl.) {Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)(b)};
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 760A(a) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 760A(a)}.
35
AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 224, ACCESS TO FINANCIAL
ADVICE IN AUSTRALIA 4, 7, 10 (2010). {Australian Securities and Investments
Commission, Access to Financial Advice in Australia, Report 224 (December 2010) 4,
7, 10.}
36
Id. at 29. {Ibid 29.}
37
Id. at 32–35. {Ibid 32–5.}
38
The median number of products on a list was 400. AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS.
COMM’N, REPORT 251, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ADVICE INDUSTRY PRACTICE 7, 23
(2011). {Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Review of Financial
Advice Industry Practice, Report 251 (September 2011) 7, 23.} Product platforms
have been described as “a one-stop shop or supermarket for managed funds and
other financial instruments.” ECON. LEGISLATION COMM., SENATE, CORPORATIONS
AMENDMENT (FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE) BILL 2011 [PROVISIONS] AND
CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT (FURTHER FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE MEASURES)
BILL 2011 [PROVISIONS], at xi (2012) [hereinafter SENATE ECONOMICS LEGISLATION
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES]. {The Senate Economics
Legislation Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporations
Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011 [Provisions] and Corporations
Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 [Provisions]
(March 2012) xi.} On platforms, see generally AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER 176, REVIEW OF ASIC POLICY ON PLATFORMS: UPDATE TO RG
148 (2012). {See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Review of ASIC
Policy on Platforms: Update to RG 148, Consultation Paper 176, March 2012.} RG
148 is about investor-directed portfolio services. An earlier draft version of the
legislation included a provision stating that if it was apparent the client required a
product not on the approved product list, the adviser did not have to investigate that
product. See Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011 (Cth)
s 961G (Austl.). {See Exposure Draft, Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial
Advice) Bill 2011 (Cth), s 961G.}
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Historically, the greatest revenue to planners comes from
volume-based remuneration paid by a fund manager or a product
provider.39 In the general community, there is apparently a high
level of distrust of financial planners.40
There is also a
significant gap between the cost of advice to planners and the
amounts consumers are prepared to pay for advice.41 A partial
explanation may be the range of amounts for which consumers
want advice. One of the reasons for the distrust is greater
realization within the Australian community of remuneration
models which have depended on commissions paid to advisers,
including trail commissions.42 Commissions have been identified
as a factor that leads advisers into conflicts of interest and to
recommend inappropriate products.43 They have also been touted
39
AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 251, supra note 38, at 11.
{Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 251, above n 38, 11.}
40
AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 224, supra note 35, at 60.
{Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 224, above n 35, 60.}
The Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation
spoke of restoring trust. See Marcus Ap, The Future of Financial Advice Reforms:
Restoring Public Trust and Confidence in Financial Advisers—An Unfinished
Puzzle, 10 CANBERRA L. REV. 188, 188 (2011). {Marcus Ap, ‘The Future of Financial
Advice Reforms: Restoring Public Trust And Confidence in Financial Advisers—An
Unfinished Puzzle’ (2011) 10 (3) Canberra Law Review 188, 188.} This paper also
comments on the proposal that use of the term “financial planner” or “financial
adviser” should be restricted to those who are members of a professional standards
board and on the range of competence within the industry. See id. at 189, 194–95.
{See 189, 194–5.}
41
Planners say the average cost is $2,500 to $3,500; consumers are prepared to
pay on average $301. AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 224, supra note 35,
at 47. {Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 224, above n 35,
47.}
42
Seven in ten planners receive trailing commissions which are usually about
0.6% of account balances. See RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17. {Ripoll Report,
above n 7, 17.} This trailing commission might be in addition to a commission on a
new investment or contribution of up to four to five percent of the amount invested
and a volume bonus of up to 0.25% on an account balance. Id. at 27. {Ibid 27.} In
addition, advisers may receive soft dollar benefits such as holidays and tickets to
sporting events. Id. at 75 n.16. {Ibid 75.} Some clients may not understand this
ongoing fee, which means that ongoing fees may be charged without relating to
current financial advice. PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND REPORT,
supra note 33, at 27 {Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report, above n
33, 27}; SENATE ECONOMICS LEGISLATION COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 38, at 12 {Senate Economics Legislation Committee
on Corporations and Financial Services, above n 38, 12}.
43
The Ripoll inquiry was specifically directed to inquire into commission
arrangements. The evidence as reported by the committee divides into submissions
pointing to conflicts and churn from regulators, consumer advocates and not-forprofit superannuation funds, and submissions from the advice industry arguing that
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as a cross-subsidy of the cost of advice.44 Policy makers say that
regulation should ensure investor protection and affordable
advice.45
II. THE FIDUCIARY IN AUSTRALIAN LAW
In Australian law, fiduciary duties are proscriptive, not
prescriptive.46 They arise because of the existence of obligations
in the particular instance, not because of the relationship.47
Australian courts have not provided a statement of when persons
stand in a fiduciary relationship.48 Justice Jacobsen famously
said, “[P]erhaps the most than can be said is that a fiduciary
relationship exists where a person has undertaken to act in the
interests of another and not in his or her own interests.”49 If a

conflicts can be managed and that commissions subsidize the cost of advice. RIPOLL
REPORT, supra note 7, at vii, 16–17, 66, 76–77. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, vii
16,17,66,76f.}
44
The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, which owns the planner group
Colonial First State, argued that a full plan costs $3,570, that only three percent of
superannuation fund members who had recently switched funds were prepared to
pay this amount, and that commissions as subsidies ensure consumers have access
to advice. Id. at 77–78. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 77–8.} The extent of existing crosssubsidization of advice should be examined, and price controls could be considered.
45
Id. at 75. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 75.}
46
See, e.g., Pilmer v Duke Grp. Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR 165, 198 (Austl.) {Pilmer v
Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165 at [74]}; Breen v Williams (1996) 186
CLR 71, 113 (Austl.) {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 at 113}; Australian Sec. &
Invs. Comm’n v Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. Pty Ltd. [2007] FCA 963 (Unreported,
Jacobson, J., 28 June 2007) ¶ 290 (Austl.) {Australian Securities and Investments
Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114832) No
4 2007 FCA 963 per Jacobson J}; Aequitas Ltd. v Sparad No. 100 Ltd. [2001]
NSWSC 14, ¶ 284 (Austl.) {Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC
1006 at [284]}. See Craddock, supra note 8 {Craddock, above n 8}, for a discussion of
differences in fiduciary law in Australia and the United States.
47
See generally P.D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS (1977) {P Finn, Fiduciary
Obligations (Law Book Company, 1977)}; P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in
EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES, AND TRUSTS (T. G. Youdan ed., 1989) {P Finn, ‘The Fiduciary
Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Law Book Company,
1989)}. These sources are often judicially cited.
48
Breen, 186 CLR at 106 {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 per Gaudron J
and McHugh J at 106}; Hodgson v Amcor Ltd. (2012) 264 FLR 1, ¶ 1343 (Austl.)
{Hodgson v Amcor; Amcor v Barnes &Ors [2012] VSC 94 per Vickery J at [1343]}.
49
Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. Pty Ltd., [2007] FCA ¶ 272. {Australian
Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty
Limited (ACN 113 114832) No 4 [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [272].} However,
“[f]iduciary obligations often arise in cases where one person is under an obligation
to act in the interests of another, but that does not mean that the obligation to act in
the interests of another is a fiduciary obligation.” Aequitas Ltd., [2001] NSWSC
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fiduciary obligation arises, the proscriptive core is the duty of
undivided loyalty not to make an unauthorized profit and not to
have a personal interest—or other duty—that is in conflict with
the duty.50 At general law, there is no further positive duty “to
act in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.”51
The scope of a fiduciary duty will vary according to the nature of
the relationship and the facts of the case.52 A fiduciary duty can
co-exist with contractual obligations and may be excluded by
them.53
An investment adviser is likely to owe a fiduciary duty to a
client.54 Former Judge of the Federal Court of Australia, the

¶ 284. {Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 1006; [2001] NSWSC
14 per Austin J at [284].}
50
Breen, 186 CLR at 108. {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; [1996] HCA 57
per Gaudron and McHugh JJ at [41].} This proscriptive core is described as the noprofit rule and the no-conflict rule. P & V Indus. Pty Ltd. v Porto (2006) 14 VR 1,
¶ 12 (Austl.) {P &V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto [2006] VSC 131; (2006) 14VR 1 at
[12]}; see also Kevin Lindgren, Fiduciary Duty and the Ripoll Report, 28 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 435, 441 (2010) {see also K Lindgren, ‘Fiduciary Duty and the Ripoll
Report’ (2010) 28 Company and Securities Law Journal 435, 441}.
51
Breen, 186 CLR at 113. {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; [1996] HCA 57
per Gaudron and McHugh JJ at [41].}
52
Id. at 82–83 {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71}; Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S.
Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, 49 (Austl.) {Hospital Products Ltd v United States
Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41}.
53
Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. Pty Ltd., [2007] FCA ¶ 276 {Australian
Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty
Limited (ACN 113 114832) No 4 [2007] FCA 963}; Aequitas Ltd., [2001] NSWSC
¶ 283 {Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 1006 per Austin J at
[287]}; see Peter Devonshire, Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 32
SYDNEY L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2010) {see P Devonshire, ‘Account of Profits for Breach
of Fiduciary Duty’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 389, 393–4} (discussing limitations
to contractual exclusion of fiduciary obligations and the inference that this may be
limited to fiduciary relations between commercial parties).
54
Daly v Sydney Stock Exch. Ltd. (1986) 160 CLR 371, 385 (Austl.) {Daly v The
Sydney Stock Exchange (1986) 160 CLR 371; 1986 HCA 25}; Citigroup Global Mkts.
Austl. Pty Ltd., [2007] FCA ¶ 272–85 {Australian Securities and Investments
Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114832) No
4 [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J [282]–[285]}; Tomasetti v Brailey [2011] NSWSC
1446, ¶ 543 (Austl.) {Tomasetti v Brailey [2011] NSWSC 1446}; Brown v Australian
Sec. & Invs. Comm’n [2009] AATA 286, ¶ 151 (Austl.) {Brown v Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (2009) 108 ALD 625; [2009] AATA 286}. In Hadid v
Lenfest Commc’ns Inc. [1999] FCA 1798, ¶ 817 (Austl.) {Hadid v Lenfest
Communications Inc [1999] FCA 1798 per Lehane J [817]}, Justice Lehane said:
“[A]dvisers may, and often do, have fiduciary obligations” and:
[t]here is little doubt that the principle extends more broadly in the case of
advisers whose task it is to counsel ‘an advised party as to how his
interests will or might best be served in a matter which our society
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Honorable Kevin Lindgren QC, points out that a fiduciary duty
does not concern the quality or the very best advice.55 Lindgren
says that prescriptive statutory requirements imposed on
professionals are akin to a common law duty to exercise
reasonable care and skill, breach of which will result in
negligence.56 In other words, they are “quasi-tortious.”57 The
obligation to disclose, he says, is not fiduciary per se, but linked
to the defense to equitable damages for breach of the no-profit,
no-conflict rule which, unlike common law damages, will not be
restricted to the loss to the beneficiary but will include the profit
made by the fiduciary.58 By way of contrast with fiduciary law,
the prescriptive regulation of advisers requires them to act in a
certain way. The legislative proscription of particular forms of
remuneration is a further departure from classic fiduciary law.
The language of a statutory “best interests” duty in Australia
derives from the trust context of superannuation regulation and
the duties of responsible entities of managed funds. Along with
fiduciary duties, a trustee of a superannuation fund has a
statutory duty to act in the best interests of all beneficiaries of a
fund.59 A responsible entity must act in the best interests of
considers to be of importance to the advised’s personal or financial wellbeing’ . . . .
Id. (quoting Paul Finn, Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World, in
COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 7, 10–11 (Ewan
McKendrick ed., 1992) {Finn, “Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World” in
[E McKendrick, Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, 1992], pp
10, 11’}).
55
See Lindgren, supra note 50, at 438. {Lindgren, above n 50, 435, 436–8.}
However, note that in Daly, 160 CLR at 385 {Daly v the Sydney Stock Exchange
(1986) 160 CLR 371; [1986] HCA 25}, Justice Brennan said that in the case of a
financial adviser who gives advice on an investment in which the adviser has a
financial interest the duty is “to give the best advice which the adviser could give.”
56
See Lindgren, supra note 50, at 436–38. {Lindgren, above n 50, 435–6, 438.}
57
Pilmer v Duke Grp. Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR 165, 197–98 (Austl.). {Pilmer v Duke
Group ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165 at [74].}
58
Lindgren, supra note 50, at 435, 438. {Lindgren, above n 50, 435, 438.}
59
See Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(2)(c) (Austl.).
{Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(2)( c ).} There is also a
statutory obligation that company directors should act in good faith and in the best
interests of the company. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1)(a) (Austl.).
{Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1)(a).} Litigation has tended to concern associated
obligations to act for a proper purpose. See, e.g., Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n v
Adler [2002] NSWSC 171, ¶ 8 (Austl.). {See, for example, ASIC v Adler [2002]
NSWSC 171.} In Adler, Justice Santow referred to the statutory business judgment
rule as a “safe harbour,” language also used by ASIC to describe the best interests
steps by financial advisers in section 961B(2). Id. {Ibid}
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members and, in the case of a conflict, give priority to members’
interests.60 The superannuation provision is concerned with the
discretionary powers of the trustee. The fiduciary duty and the
statutory duty have been treated as coterminus, importing the
equitable duty into a statute. It has been held that this
superannuation statutory duty imposes no higher standard on a
trustee than that of the general law,61 and that the general law
obligation could be expressed as it is in the language of the
statute.62 Unlike the trustee of a superannuation fund, a
financial adviser in the capacity of giving advice is not a trustee,
and it is unlikely that the financial adviser’s statutory duty is
identical to a fiduciary duty.
The lack of clarity surrounding the best interests duty is
compounded by ASIC, which assumes that the new FOFA laws
express a legislative fiduciary duty,63 yet at the same time
intends to administer the best interests duty in the light of other
obligations, which may include “common law obligations such as
the duty of care and fiduciary duties.”64
Two recent Federal Court decisions found breaches of
fiduciary duty in circumstances of financial advice.65 Both
involved the sale of complex financial products to relatively
unsophisticated local government councils in the lead up to the

60
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601FC(1)(c) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 601FC (1)(c).}
61
Invensys Austl. Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd. v Austrac Invs. Ltd. (2006) 198
FLR 302, 323–24, ¶¶ 102–07. {Invensys Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v
Austrac Investments Ltd [2006] VSC 112; [2006] 15 VR 87 at[102]-[107].} Cowan v
Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750 (Austl.) {Cowan v Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750} analyzes
the duties of a trustee of a pension fund; but as with superannuation funds, this
concerns the power to invest, not the giving of advice.
62
Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corp. Pty Ltd.
(2011) 282 ALR 167, ¶ 121 (Austl.). {Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers
Superannuation Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 204 per Giles JA at [121].}
63
See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 6–7. {ASIC
Consultation Paper 182, above n 31, 6–7.} For a critique of ASIC’s approach to
fiduciary law, see Craddock, supra note 8, at 221 {see Craddock, above n 8, 221}.
64
See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 12. {ASIC
Consultation Paper 182, above n 31, 12.}
65
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Bros. Austl. Ltd. [2012] FCA 1028,
¶¶ 932–46 (Austl.) {Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd
(in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 at [932]–[946]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council v Local Gov’t Fin.
Servs. Pty Ltd. (No. 5) [2012] FCA 1200, ¶¶ 2278–84 (Austl.) {Bathurst Regional
Council v Local Government Financial Services. Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200}.
These cases were decided subsequent to the written Article presented at the
Symposium.
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2008 financial crisis.66 The advice was pursuant to contractual
and non-contractual arrangements.67 Although a fiduciary duty
arises as an incident of a particular relationship and can be
modified by contract, both cases establish that a financial adviser
owes a fiduciary duty to those with whom it deals.68 These
decisions contrast with the decision concerning a rating agency in
so far as it assigns a rating. In Bathurst Regional Council v
Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd., the court held
that when a rating agency assigns a rating, this does not of itself
create a fiduciary relationship, and further, that a rating is an
expert opinion, not advice.69 In both cases, the financial advisors
failed to sufficiently disclose conflicts of interest and the extent to
which they would benefit from the transactions.70
III. BEST INTERESTS AND APPROPRIATE ADVICE
The FOFA legislation distinguishes between a duty in
relation to the advice and the standard of the advice; the adviser
must act in the best interests of the client and the advice must be
appropriate to the client.71 The relationship between the acts of
the adviser and the standard of the advice is that the adviser
meets the standard of appropriate advice by acting in the best

66
See Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 30–695 {See Wingecarribee
Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 per Rares
J at [30]–[695]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 1–24 {Bathurst Regional
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 per
Jagot J at [1]–[24]}.
67
See Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 30–695 {see Wingecarribee
Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 per Rares
J at [30]–[695]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 1–24 {Bathurst Regional
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 per
Jagot J at [1]–[24]}.
68
See Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 729–30, 733 {see
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA
1028 per Rares J at [729], [730], [733]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶ 2314
{Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5)
[2012] FCA 1200 at [2314]}.
69
Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 2528, 2534, 2789–90. {Bathurst
Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA
1200 per Jagot J at [2528], [2534], [2789], [2790].}
70
Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 939, 941 {Wingecarribee Shire
Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 at [939], [941]};
Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶ 50 {Bathurst Regional Council v Local
Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 at [50]}.
71
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 961B(1), 961G (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) ss 961B(1), 961G.}
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interests of the client.72 Thus, the standard of the advice is
judged by reference to the acts of the adviser, not by the nature of
the resulting advice. There is no obligation to provide advice that
is “best” for the client. The new statutory obligation is different
from a fiduciary duty as it operates in Australia and may fall
short of the pre-existing obligation to provide appropriate
advice.73
If there is a conflict of interest between the interests of the
provider and the interests of the client, there is an obligation for
the adviser to give priority to the interests of the client.74 There
is also an obligation to warn the client if the advice is based on
information that is inadequate or incomplete.75
An adviser may fulfill the best interests duty and thus
provide appropriate advice by completing all of the best interests
steps prior to giving the advice.76 The legislation does not
indicate that this way is the only way to fulfill the best interests
duty. It is possible to provide advice without having completed or
having inadequately completed the best interests steps.77 It is
unclear how an adviser may satisfy the best interests duty in an
alternate way.78 The best interests steps themselves do not
72

Id. s 961G. {Ibid s 961G.}
Andrew J. Serpell, The Future of Financial Advice Reforms, 30 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 240, 251(2012) {A Serpell, ‘The Future of Financial Advice Reforms’ (2012)
30 Company and Securities Law Journal 240 at 251} suggests the significant
difference is that a contravention of the now repealed section 945A entailed a
criminal offense. Section 945A was repealed in Corporations Amendment (Further
Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 cl 6 (Austl.) {Section 945A
was repealed in Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice
Measures) Act 2012 Schedule 1 cl 6}.
74
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 961J.} This obligation is different from the Australian financial services license
obligation which requires a licensee to have adequate arrangements in place to
manage conflicts of interest. Id. s 912A(1)(aa). {Ibid s 912A(1)(aa).} This “statutory
requirement is to be contrasted with the duty in equity of a fiduciary to eliminate or
avoid conflicts.” See Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n v Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl.
Pty Ltd. [2007] FCA 963, ¶¶ 311, 441. {Australian Securities and Investments
Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114832) No
4 [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [311], see also [441]f.}
75
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961H (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 961H.}
76
Id. s 961B(2). {Ibid s 961B(2).}
77
See id. s 961B(1). {Ibid s 961B(1).}
78
ASIC is yet to give any guidance on complying with the best interests duty
without completing the steps in s 961B(2) in its Consultation Papers. Since this duty
is a positive duty to act, the proscriptive no-conflict, no-profit approach may be
insufficient. A court may look to the content of a fiduciary duty. For instance, in
73
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positively require advice to be based on accurate and complete
information.79 The provider must undertake each of the steps to
meet the best interests obligation via this route.80 The standard
in taking each step is tort-like. It references the existing
reasonable expertise of the industry in making judgments about
the best interest of the client.81 If a provider with a reasonable
level of expertise would take a step, then it is in the best
interests of the client. This standard does not go directly to the
advice given to the client; it goes to the judgments made by the
adviser in advising the client.82 It goes to process, not outcome.83
The Explanatory Memorandum for FOFA states that these best
interests steps are not envisaged as an “exhaustive and
mechanical checklist,”84 which is consistent with the inclusion of

Daly v. Sydney Stock Exchange, the duty was to furnish clients with all relevant
knowledge concealing nothing relevant to making the investment decision. Daly v.
Sydney Stock Exchange (1986) 160 CLR 371, 385 (Austl.). {Daly v the Sydney Stock
Exchange (1986) 160 CLR 371 per Brennan J at [385]; [1986] HCA 25.} A court may
also look at other statutory provisions which require acting in best interests. In
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v. Maxwell, Justice Brereton said
“a breach of the obligation to act bona fide in the interests of the company involves a
consciousness that what is being done is not in the interests of the company, and
deliberate conduct in disregard of that knowledge.” Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n
v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373, ¶ 107. {Australian Securities & Investments
Commission v Maxwell [2006] NSWSC 1052 per Brereton J at [107].} These different
approaches will need to be resolved.
79
This situation is quite different from the obligation, in separate legislation,
imposed on intermediaries, who are finance brokers, or “credit assistants,” and
provide suggestions about consumer credit products. See National Consumer Credit
Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 8 (Austl.). {National Consumer Credit Protection Act
(Cth) 2009.}
80
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 961B(2).}
81
Id. s 961E. {Ibid s 961E.}
82
Id. s 961B(2)(f). {Ibid s 961B(f).}
83
There is an untested assumption that “good processes will improve the
quality of the advice that is provided.” See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 33, at 10. {See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory
Memorandum, above n 33, 10, [1.23].} In contrast, ASIC warns that advice should
leave clients in a better position. See ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra note 21,
at 47 {ASIC Regulatory Guide 175, above n 21, 175.A27–28}; ASIC CONSULTATION
PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 12 {ASIC Consultation Paper 182, above n 31}.
84
See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at
10. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 10, [1.25].}
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the last step requiring the adviser to take “any other step
that . . . would reasonably be regarded as being in the best
interests of the client.”85
The provider should first identify the following: (1) the
objectives, financial situation, and needs of the client86—but
there is no obligation to go beyond the client’s instructions or to
verify the information; (2) the subject matter of the advice sought
by the client—either explicitly or implicitly;87 (3) the
circumstances of the client that are relevant to the advice sought
on that subject matter—that is, a filtering of the client objectives,
financial situation, and needs.88
If it is reasonably apparent that information about the
client’s relevant circumstances is incomplete or inaccurate, the
provider must make reasonable inquiries to obtain complete and
accurate advice.89 The legislation provides a standard akin to a
tort duty of care to determine whether something is reasonably
apparent.90 There is no legislative indication of what reasonable

85

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(g) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 961B(2)(g).} The inclusion of this step means that the steps do not provide a
“safe harbour” for advisers, although ASIC’s draft guidance on this step suggests
that ASIC only has limited expectations of what an adviser would need to do to
satisfy this requirement. ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 57–59
{ASIC Consultation Paper 182, above n 31}; ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra
note 21, at 69–86 {ASIC Regulatory Guide 175, above n 21,175.A110-A113}.
86
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(a) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 961B(2)(a).}
87
Id. s 961B(2)(b)(i). {Ibid s 961B(2)(b)(i).}
88
Id. s 961B(2)(ii). {Ibid s 961B(2)(b)(ii).} The Explanatory Memorandum says
explicitly that this process is to accommodate limited or scaled advice. See Further
FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12. {Further FOFA
Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12, [1.35].}
89
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(c) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 961B(2)(c).}
90
“Something is reasonably apparent if it would be apparent to a person with a
reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter of the advice that has been sought
by the client, were that person exercising care and objectively assessing the
information given to the provider by the client.” Id. s 961C. {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 961C.} This test is not dissimilar to the notion of peer professional opinion in
the Civil Liability Act. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5O. {See Civil Liability
Act (NSW) s 5 O.} The Explanatory Memorandum says that this test is an objective
test based on the standards of the industry and the subject matter of the advice,
which will vary according to the complexity of the advice. Further FOFA Bill
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12. {Further FOFA Bill
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12 [1.37].}
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inquiries might entail. The obligation is the making of the
inquiry. There is no obligation that the information actually be
complete and accurate.91
Having done this, the provider must then ask a question of
himself or herself: Does he or she have the expertise to give
advice on the subject matter concerned? If not, the adviser must
decline to give advice.92 There is no specific provision dealing
with the possibility that a provider may overestimate his or her
expertise.93
Next, if it would be reasonable to consider
recommending a financial product to the client on the subject
matter of the advice sought by the client, the provider must
conduct an investigation of possible financial products,94 assess
the information gleaned by this investigation,95 and base all
judgments in advising the client on the circumstances of the
client.96
The matter at issue here is the nature of the
investigation. The investigation is into products for those
filtered, relevant circumstances identified by the provider, but it
does not require an investigation into “every financial product
available.”97 However, if the client asks the provider to consider
a specified financial product, then this product must be included
in the investigation.98 Finally, in actually advising the client, the
provider must base all judgments on the client’s relevant
circumstances.99
There is a carve-out from the best interests steps for two
types of products. If the subject matter of the advice is a basic
banking product or a general insurance product, the providers do
not have to assess their own competence, investigate products to
91
Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12.
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12, [1.36].}
92
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(d) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 961B (2)(d).}
93
Australian financial services licensees must maintain their competence to
provide the service for which they are licensed and ensure that their representatives
are adequately trained and competent. Id. s 912A(1)(e), (f). {Ibid s 912A (1)(e)(f).}
94
Id. s 961B(2)(e)(i). {Ibid s 961B (2)(e)(i).}
95
Id. s 961B(2)(e)(ii). {Ibid s 961B (2)(e)(ii).}
96
Id. s 961B(2)(f). {Ibid s 961B (2)(f).}
97
They must conduct an investigation into products that might “achieve those of
the objectives and meet those of the needs of the client that would reasonably be
considered as relevant to advice on that subject matter.” Id. ss 961B(2)(e)(i),
961D(1). {Ibid ss 961B(2)(e)(i); 961D(1).}
98
See id. s 961D(2) {Ibid s 961D(2)} (stating no indication of how specific a
specified financial product must be).
99
Id. s 961B(2)(f). {Ibid s 961B(2)(f).}
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achieve the aims of the client, base judgments on the client’s
circumstances, or take other reasonable steps. They, however,
must still take the first three steps, which include identifying the
client’s objectives, identifying the subject matter of the advice,
and if necessary, making inquiries to obtain further
information.100
The best interests steps have been criticized for promoting
perfunctory compliance and possibly leading to outcomes that
would fail a common law test of the duty of care of a financial
adviser.101 ASIC itself describes the best interests steps as a
“safe harbour.”102
If it is clear that the information on which advice is based is
incomplete or inaccurate, the provider can still give advice but
must warn the client.103 This warning must be given at the same
time as the advice is given, must state that the advice is
incomplete or inaccurate in relation to the relevant
circumstances of the client and must also state that before acting
on the advice, the client should consider whether it is
appropriate.104 This warning suggests that, notwithstanding the
obligation to give only appropriate advice,105 clients still have to
ask themselves if the advice is appropriate, because in some
circumstances it may not be.
Some providers may make
inquiries and obtain information requested, but as a failsafe they
may still give a warning.
This provision is different from the earlier obligation to warn
if advice was based on incomplete or inaccurate information. The
new provision rests on it being “reasonably apparent” that the
100

Id. s 961B(2)–(4). {Ibid ss 961B(2)–(4).}
See Craddock, supra note 8, at 235. {Craddock, above n 8, 235.} The question
here is not whether a duty of care exists but the scope of that duty. Does it require
an adviser to seek out investment opportunities or simply draw the client’s attention
to opportunities of which the adviser is aware? This distinction is discussed in
Aequitas Ltd. v. Sparad No. 100 Ltd., in which the latter was preferred. Aequitas
Ltd. v. Sparad No. 100 Ltd. [2001] NSWSC 14, ¶ 82 (Austl.). {Aequitas v Aefc [2001]
NSWSC 14 per Austin J at [82].} It is important to recognize, however, that the best
interests steps do override common law duties where they apply. See ASIC
CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 12–13. {See ASIC Consultation Paper
182, above n 31, [30].}
102
ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 10. {ASIC Consultation
Paper 182, above n 31, 17.}
103
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961H (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 961H.}
104
See id. s 961H(1), (2). {Ibid ss 961H(2), 961H(10)(a)(b).}
105
See id. s 961G. {Ibid s 961G.}
101
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information is incomplete or inaccurate. Under the old provision,
the obligation arose if the providing entity knew the information
was incomplete or inaccurate, or was reckless as to whether it
was incomplete or inaccurate.106
A.

Priority to the Client

The obligation to give priority to the interests of the client
complements the obligation of the provider to act in the best
interests of the client, which may involve the process of the best
interests steps at the level of care of a person with a reasonable
level of expertise.107 Unlike the licensee requirement to manage
conflicts, this requirement falls on the individual advice provider.
The obligation arises only if the provider knows or should know
there is a conflict between the interests of the client and
others.108 The legislation has no definition of conflict of interest
and the examples in the Explanatory Memorandum concern
payments.109
The rules target those beyond the adviser whose interests
may be in conflict with the client. They are specifically listed and
include the provider and his or her associates, financial services
licensee and associates, and authorized representatives of the
licensee and associates.110 Again, there is a carve-out for basic
banking products and general insurance products.111
A provider may still charge for services at a market rate and
in some circumstances may still accept a commission.112 ASIC
proposes that to comply with the priority rule, advisers should
consider what amounts to a “no conflicts” approach and ask
“what an advice provider without a conflict of interest would
do.”113
106

Id. s 945B (repealed 2012). {Ibid s 945B (repealed).}
See id. s 961J. {Ibid s 961J.}
108
Id. s 961J(1). {Ibid s 961J(1).}
109
See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at
19. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 19, [1.67]–
[1.68].}
110
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J(1)(a)–(f) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) ss 961J(1)(a)–(f).}
111
Id. s 961J(2), (3). {Ibid ss 961J(2)–961J(3).}
112
See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at
19. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 19, [1.67]–
[1.68].}
113
See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 21. {ASIC
Consultation Paper 182, above n 31, 21.}
107
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Limited or Scaleable Advice

The scope of the financial adviser’s obligation to the client
will depend on what the client wants and the arrangements
between the client and the adviser. Scaleable advice is personal
advice that is limited in scope.114 ASIC reports that more clients
want advice on a case-by-case basis and are not looking for
comprehensive advice; financial planners fear that if they give
such piecemeal advice they may fall afoul of the rule to act in the
best interests of the client.115 The Explanatory Memorandum
clearly says that step two, identifying the subject matter of the
advice sought by the client, is to facilitate both scaled, limited,
targeted, and specific advice on a single matter as well as
comprehensive, holistic advice.116 But it warns: “The scaling of
advice by the provider must itself be in the client’s best interests,
especially since the client’s instructions may at times be unclear
or not appropriate for his or her circumstances.”117
In the situation where a client is unable to easily identify the
subject matter of the advice he or she wants, the Explanatory
Memorandum says advisers should discuss this subject matter
with the client. This conversation should be about what subject
matter for advice would be in the client’s best interests, also
taking into account how much the client wishes to pay for the
advice and the client’s overall circumstances.118 Again, the
Explanatory Memorandum warns that the adviser cannot escape
these difficulties simply by stating in the contract that the
subject matter is as requested by the client and therefore is in
the best interests of the client.119 ASIC warns that all advice,
scaled or otherwise, should leave clients in a better position and
emphasizes the importance of the judgment of the adviser,

114
AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, CONSULATION PAPER 183, GIVING
INFORMATION, GENERAL ADVICE AND SCALED ADVICE 7 (2012) [hereinafter ASIC
CONSULTATION PAPER 183]. {Australian Securities and Investments Commission,
Giving Information, General Advice and Scaled Advice, Consultation Paper 183,
August 2012 (‘ASIC Consultation Paper 183’) 7.}
115
Id. at 8 {Ibid 8}; see PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND
REPORT, supra note 33, at 55 {Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report,
above n 33, 55}.
116
See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at
12. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12, [1.34].}
117
Id. {Ibid.}
118
Id. at 11–12. {Ibid 11, [1.33].}
119
Id. at 11. {Ibid.}
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including, in some circumstances, declining to give advice.120
ASIC admonishes that important issues, such as debt on
retirement or insurance attached to superannuation, should not
be omitted because they are too difficult to resolve.121 The
interplay among elucidating the subject matter of the advice, the
relevant circumstances of the client, and the best interests of the
client does not seem to facilitate the scaling of advice that ASIC
reports clients want and instead may challenge some advisers.
C.

Falling Short of a Fiduciary Duty

One commentator’s main objections to the legislation are
“legal incoherence” and its capacity to hinder the development
and application of both common law and fiduciary law to
financial advisers.122 Craddock believes that the best interests
obligation adds little to the existing obligation to provide
appropriate advice; there is a clear intention to create a statutory
fiduciary duty which has miscarried; and the steps to satisfy the
best interests requirement are probably less than required to
satisfy the common law duty of care expected of a financial
adviser.123 He also argues that the persistence of conflicts is not
overcome by the rule to prioritize the client in case of conflicts.124
It is possible that the statutory best interests, appropriate
advice, and client priority duties may alter some product
recommendations. The jury is out on whether, by themselves,
these duties will enhance the quality of advice.

120
See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 183, supra note 114, at 27, 29, 31. {ASIC
Consultation Paper 183, above n 114, 27, 29, 31.} Judgment is important as the
legislation also provides for the possibility of advice via a computer program. See
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND REPORT, supra note 33, at 57. {See
discussion in Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report, above n 33, 57.}
121
See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 183, supra note 114, at 31. {ASIC
Consultation Paper 183, above n 114, 31.}
122
Craddock, supra note 8, at 236. {Craddock, above n 8, 236f.}
123
Id. at 234–35. {Ibid 234–5.} For a further discussion of the best interests duty
as a duty of care and not a fiduciary duty, see PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE
INQUIRY AND REPORT, supra note 33, at 47 {see Parliamentary Joint Committee
Inquiry and Report, above n 33, 47}.
124
Craddock, supra note 8, at 236 {Craddock, above n 8, 236} (contrasting the
statutory duty with the fiduciary no conflicts rule). Of course, the difference is that
the fiduciary duty can be managed through informed consent which is not possible
under the statutory duty.
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IV. CONFLICTED REMUNERATION
Of all the FOFA changes, the ban on conflicted remuneration
arguably has the biggest impact on the financial services sector
in Australia. The introduction of the best interests duty and
related provisions is a significant step in the process of raising
professional standards for financial advisers, but most advisers
and licensees believe that they are currently acting in their
client’s best interests and regard this change as more iterative
than revolutionary. The opt-in and fee disclosure elements of
FOFA have certainly been the most controversial changes and
will have significant implications for adviser-client relations.
However, these changes will not have as large an impact on
relationships between industry participants. By contrast, the
conflicted remuneration prohibitions are leading to a complete
transformation of the commercial relationships between advisers
and licensees, licensees and issuers, and platforms and fund
managers. Licensees are struggling to develop compliant models
of remuneration, which effectively align adviser and licensee
interests to incentivize adviser conduct in relation to existing and
new clients.
This impact on commercial relationships differentiates
FOFA from other major reforms in the financial services sector in
the past, including the introduction of the financial services
licensing and disclosure regime from 2001 to 2003, the
implantation of upgraded anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing legislation from 2006 to 2008, and the
introduction of consumer credit licensing and suitability
obligations in 2009.
These changes imposed significant
compliance burdens on the industry. However, the impact
mainly affected back office compliance arrangements and retail
disclosure. Unlike FOFA, they did not require significant
adjustment of remuneration arrangements or business models.
There are a number of key elements to the ban on conflicted
remuneration. First, the ban applies to licensees and also to
advisers directly when accepting remuneration. Licensees must
take reasonable steps to ensure that their representatives do not
accept conflicted remuneration.125 Second, it also applies to
employers
of
advisers
and
product
issuers
paying
125
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963E, 963F (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) ss 963E, 963F.}
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remuneration.126 Third, there is a general ban on remuneration
which could reasonably be expected to influence retail advice and
a presumption that volume-based payments will influence
advice.127 Fourth, the ban applies to both monetary and nonmonetary benefits.128 Fifth, there are certain exceptions, in
particular for insurance and banking products and for certain
types of “soft dollar” benefits.129 Sixth, there are specific bans on
platform operators accepting shelf-space fee payments from fund
managers and charging asset-based fees on borrowed amounts.130
Seventh, grandfathering of existing arrangements is permitted,
in part due to constitutional concerns about the ability to apply
the ban to such arrangements.131 Eigth, anti-avoidance applies—
discussed further below.132 Finally, apart from the shelf-space fee
ban, the bans do not apply to the wholesale market.133
A.

Background to the Ban

The ban on conflicted remuneration originated with concerns
regarding conflicted advice models, in particular the Storm
Financial
model,
which
relied
on
one-size-fits-all
recommendations for clients to borrow funds to invest in marketlinked investments.134 Concerns were also expressed regarding
the possible role of commissions in the failure of Opes Prime
126

Id. ss 963G, 963H. {Ibid ss 963G, 963H.}
Id. ss 963A, 963J. {Ibid ss 963A, 963J.}
128
Id. s 963A. {Ibid s 963A.}
129
Id. ss 963B–963D {Ibid ss 963B–963D}; Draft Corporations Amendment
Regulation 2012 (Cth) regs 7.7A.4.12–.14 (Austl.) {Draft Corporations Regulations
7.7A.4.12–7.7A.4.14}.
130
See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.7A, div 5 (Austl.). {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) Part 7.7A, Div 5.}
131
Id. ss 1528–1531 {Ibid ss 1528–1531}; Draft Corporations Amendment
Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.16 (Austl.) {Draft Corporations Regulation
7.7A.4.16}.
132
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 965 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 965.}
133
Id. ss 963A, 964B. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963A, 964B.} Technically,
the ban on shelf-space fees does not appear to be restricted to the wholesale market,
although it relies on a definition only used in a retail disclosure context.
134
The model relied on rising markets and assumed that this strategy would
keep working and was therefore appropriate for all clients whatever their
circumstances. RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 27–30. {Ripoll Report, above n 7,
[3.33]–[3.45], 27–30.} There was also some evidence of inappropriately high property
valuations to support larger loans. Id. at 35–36. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, [3.66]–
[3.69], 35–6.} The outcome for some clients was not only loss of investments, but loss
of assets which had been mortgaged to borrow in order to invest.
127

FINAL_BATTEN & PEARSON

2013]

2/27/2014 6:25 PM

FINANCIAL ADVICE IN AUSTRALIA

535

representatives to disclose the higher risk nature of its securities
lending arrangements.135 One of the terms of reference for the
resulting Ripoll inquiry was to investigate: “[T]he role played by
commission arrangements relating to product sales and advice,
including the potential for conflicts of interest, the need for
appropriate disclosure, and remuneration models for financial
advisers.”136
The committee concluded that disclosure had not been
effective in managing conflicts of interest137 and made
recommendations canvassing banning, which were the
forerunner of the FOFA bans on conflicted remuneration:138
6.56 The committee received considerable evidence suggesting
that the most effective way to improve the quality of financial
advice for consumers is to remove conflicts of interest altogether
by banning commissions and other conflicted remunerative
practices.
The regulation of remuneration practices was
consistently raised during the inquiry.139
Recommendation 4
6.101 The committee recommends that government consult
with and support industry in developing the most appropriate
mechanism by which to cease payments from financial product
manufacturers to financial advisers.140

135

Id. at 66. {Ibid [4.70]–[4.71], 66.}
Id. at vii. {Ibid vii.}
137
Id. at 81–85, 87. {Ibid [5.53]–[5.68], 81–5; [5.74], 87.}
138
Other measures were already being taken, including the regulation of
margin lending as a financial product, making it subject to the financial services
licensing and disclosure regime and the introduction of consumer credit licensing.
Additional measures included the requirement to give clients notice of margin calls
and the obligation on lenders and intermediaries to ensure that credit is appropriate
for the client. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 985EA–985K (Austl.) {Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) Part 7.8, Div 4A, Subdiv A}; National Consumer Credit Protection Act
2009 (Cth) ss 115–120, 123–124, 128–133 (Austl.) {National Consumer Credit
Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Part 3-1, Div 4, Div 6; Part 3-2, Div 3, Div 4}.
139
RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 116. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 116.}
140
Id. at 127. {Ibid 127.} The reference to consulting with industry recognized
that the then Investment and Financial Services Association (“IFSA”)—now
renamed the Financial Services Council (“FSC”)—had already developed an industry
standard to ban superannuation commissions by July 1, 2012. INV. & FIN. SERVS.
ASS’N LTD., IFSA’S SUPERANNUATION MEMBER CHARTER: A NEW COMMITMENT TO
SUPERANNUATION
MEMBERS
(2009),
available
at
http://riskinfo.com.au/
news/files/2009/11/091118-ifsa-superannuation-member-charter_final.pdf.
{IFSA’s
Superannuation Member Charter: A New Commitment to Superannuation Members
released on 17 November 2009.}
136
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Ban on Conflicted Remuneration

The Commonwealth government’s response was to announce
a “prospective ban on conflicted remuneration structures
including commissions and volume based payments.”141 This ban
is formulated in the legislative definition of “conflicted
remuneration”:
any benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, given to a
financial services licensee, or a representative of a financial
services licensee, who provides financial product advice to
persons as retail clients that, because of the nature of the
benefit or the circumstances in which it is given:
(a) could reasonably be expected to influence the choice of
financial product recommended by the licensee or
representative to retail clients; or
(b) could reasonably be expected to influence the financial
product advice given to retail clients by the licensee or
representative.142

The legislation does not expressly ban commissions. The ban
depends on this influence test; the circumstances in which a
benefit “could reasonably be expected to influence” advice are
critical.143
There is a presumption that a benefit is conflicted
remuneration if access to or the value of the benefit is wholly or
partly dependent on the value or number of financial products
recommended to or acquired by a client—that is, volume-based
remuneration.144 However, some volume-based benefit structures
might not be inherently conflicted.
The Explanatory

141
Press Release, Chris Bowen, Minister for Fin. Servs., Superannuation &
Corporate Law, The Treasury of the Commonwealth of Austl., No. 036 Overhaul of
Financial Advice, (Apr. 26, 2010), http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?
doc=pressreleases/2010/036.htm&pageID=003&min=ceba&Year=&DocType. {Chris
Bowen, ‘Overhaul of Financial Advice’ (Media Release No. 036, 26 April 2010)
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/036.htm
&pageID=003&min=ceba&Year=&DocType>.}
142
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 963A.}
143
Id. {Ibid.}
144
Id. s 963L. {Ibid s 963L.}
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Memorandum recognizes this and that those involved in such an
arrangement must disprove the presumption and demonstrate
that the benefits are not conflicted.145
Whether a particular remuneration structure is permitted
seems to depend on the circumstances at the time the benefit is
given or received.
Factors potentially relevant to this
consideration include the following: (1) the proportion of the
benefit to total remuneration; (2) the level of involvement of the
recipient of the benefit in giving the advice; and (3) the nature of
the link between the benefit and the value or number of financial
products recommended or acquired.
The Explanatory Memorandum states the legislation
provides flexibility to maintain broadly based performance-based
remuneration arrangements without compromising advice
provided to retail clients. It provides the following example:
[I]f the benefit was based on the total profitability of the
licensee, it was on a small percentage of the total remuneration
of the recipient, [and the recipient was not involved in providing
financial advice to retail clients] it would be less likely of being
able to influence the recommendations or advice provided to
retail clients.146

The test for conflicted remuneration based on what could
reasonably be expected to influence advice is an objective test.147
Case law indicates that “reasonably be expected” is something
“more than a possibility” but must have “real and substantial
grounds” for expectation of occurrence.148 It does not, however,

145

Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 27–
29. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, [2.18]–
[2.20].}
146
Id. at 28–29. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum,
Example 2.1, [2.19].}
147
Attorney-General’s Dep’t v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180, 193 (Austl.).
{Attorney-General’s Department & Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Cockcroft
(1986) 10 FCR 180 at 193.}
148
Id. {Ibid.}
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need to be “probable.”149 This test is consistent with the change
from a test of “might influence” the advice, which was proposed
in the Exposure Draft of the Bill.150
The context of the advice may indicate that remuneration
was not reasonably expected to influence the advice and should
not be “conflicted remuneration.” This context might involve
consideration of the level and nature of controls and other
measures designed to ensure that advice is not influenced by
remuneration, which could include the following.
C.

Consequences for the Adviser

The consequences of giving conflicted advice may reduce the
likelihood that conflicted advice will be given. Consequences
could range from a poor performance review, which affects the
level of discretionary bonus; some form of penalty; naming and
shaming; termination of employment; seeking to have advisers
banned by the regulator; or other disciplinary action. Of course,
penalties raise contractual law and, where relevant, employment
law issues regarding enforceability.
1.

Preventative Controls

The nature and effectiveness of the controls to prevent
conflicted advice from being given will also be relevant. For
example, if advice is reviewed before it is provided to the client
by someone who does not receive conflicted remuneration, then
the otherwise conflicted remuneration paid to the “adviser” may
149
In the context of freedom of information applications, it has been held that
the phrase, “could reasonably be expected” to destroy commercial value or to
prejudice future disclosure of information, should be given its ordinary meaning.
This meaning is something that is reasonable and not “irrational, absurd or
ridiculous.” Further, “it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in
terms of probabilities or possibilities.” Id. at 190 {Ibid 190}; see also Apache Nw. Pty.
Ltd. v Dep’t of Mines & Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167, ¶ 60. (Austl.) {Apache
Northwest Pty Ltd v Dept of Mines and Petroleum (No 2) [2011] WASC 283}; Searle
Austl. Pty Ltd. v Pub. Interest Advocacy Ctr. (1992) 36 FCR 111, 123 (Austl.) {Searle
Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre [1992] FCA 241; (1992) 36 FCR
111, 123}; News Corp. v Nat’l Cos. & Sec. Comm’n (1984) 5 FCR 88, 101 (Austl.)
{News Corporation Ltd v National Companies and Securities Commission (1984) 5
FCR 88 per Woodward J at 101} (“A reasonable expectation of an event requires
more than a possibility, risk or chance of the event occurring.”).
150
Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures)
Bill 2011 (Cth) s 963(1) (Austl.). {Exposure Draft, Corporations Amendment
(Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011, 28 September 2011, clause
963(1).}
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be unlikely to influence the advice actually given to the client.
This review may not be practical for some organizations or
certain types of advice—for example, quick telephone-based
advice.
2.

Effectiveness of Controls

A compliance regime with serious consequences for conflicted
advice will only be effective if it is actually implemented and is
seen to be implemented.
3.

Cultural Factors

The ethical environment of the organization is also likely to
be relevant.
An effective compliance regime requires an
organizational culture which supports and fosters compliance. It
must be actively and visibly supported at all levels of the
organization and could be undermined in a particular area by the
attitude of staff or management in that area.
None of these measures are likely to be enough on their own
to establish that remuneration could not reasonably be expected
to influence advice. A licensee would presumably also need to be
satisfied that its controls are stronger than the average level of
controls currently prevalent in the Australian financial services
industry. ASIC’s position on the ability of licensees to continue
to pay remuneration linked to conflicted factors, such as funds
under advice, by implementing appropriate control measures, is
currently unknown and will be an important consideration for
licensees.
The ban applies both to those accepting remuneration—
licensees and their representatives—and to product issuers and
employers of representatives paying remuneration.151 The ban on
151
See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963E, 963K (Austl.). {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) Part 7.7A, Division 4, Subdivision C.} The ban is a civil penalty provision
for licensees and authorized representatives—who are generally not employees—but
not for employed representatives. Id. ss 963E, 963G, 963H. {Ibid ss 963E, 963G–
963H.} Employees are only subject to the ban where the remuneration is not
received from their employer on the basis that “in the majority of cases it is the
employer, rather than the employee, that sets the terms and conditions of an
employment contract [and is] in control of remuneration payments.” Further FOFA
Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 36. {Further FOFA Bill
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 36, [2.57].} Employees who do
accept conflicted remuneration from someone other than their employer may be
subject to a banning order. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963H (Austl.). {Note to
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963H.} Licensees must in any case take reasonable
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product issuers paying conflicted remuneration may be
challenging to implement given the definition of conflicted
remuneration and the presumption that volume based benefits
are conflicted. As discussed above, it is a question of fact
whether particular remuneration is conflicted in the hands of the
recipient.152 It is therefore difficult for an issuer to assess this
fact. It may require issuers to undertake due diligence of
unrelated licensees to ensure payments received are not
conflicted—it is certainly likely that appropriate assurances will
be required.
D. Exemptions from the Ban
Exemptions from the ban on conflicted remuneration include
the following: (1) client “given” benefits; (2) most simple banking
product advice; (3) most insurance-related advice, subject to some
important exceptions; (4) execution only benefits; (5) stamping
fees and brokerage; (6) “soft dollar” benefits worth less than 300
AUD which are not given frequently or regularly; (7) education
and training; and (8) information technology software or support
relating to products provided by the benefit provider. Each of
these exemptions gives rise to interesting issues.
1.

Client “Given” Benefits

There is an exemption to the ban on conflicted remuneration
where: “[T]he benefit is given to the licensee or representative by
a retail client in relation to: (i) the issue or sale of a financial
product by the licensee or representative to the client; or
(ii) financial product advice given by the licensee or
representative to the client.”153
“Give” or “given” is not defined. However, doing an act, such
as giving a benefit, includes causing or authorizing the act or
thing to be done.154 Consequently, this exemption for benefits
steps to ensure that their representatives do not accept conflicted remuneration. Id.
s 963F. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963F.}
152
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963L (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s
963L}; see supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
153
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963B(1)(d), 963C(e) (Austl.). {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) ss 963B(1)(d), 963C(e).}
154
Id. s 52. {Ibid s 52.} While there is no case law on this provision,
consideration has been given to “authorise.” In Ex parte Johnson, Chief Justice
Jordan said, “The word ‘authorize,’ according to its natural meaning, signifies the
conferring upon a person of a right to do something which, apart from the
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given by a client can extend to advisers where the client directly
gives the benefit to the adviser—for example, by paying advice
fees to the adviser—or causes or authorizes the benefit to be
given to the adviser.
The Explanatory Memorandum supports the conclusion that
the benefit does not need to be given directly by the client. It
states:
‘[F]ee for service’ arrangements—where the client is the person
paying the adviser—are not conflicted remuneration (even
where the client pays a volume-based fee). The provision is
intended to exclude from the definition of conflicted
remuneration any fee for service paid by the retail client,
whether the benefit is given directly by the retail client or is
given by another party at the direction, or with the clear
consent, of the retail client.155

This exemption seems to indicate that Parliament did not
intend to infringe on a client’s ability to agree to any fee
structure he or she might see fit. However, advisers and
licensees are subject to other duties which will affect their ability
to propose or agree to particular remuneration arrangements.156

authorization, he does not possess.” Ex parte Johnson (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 16, 18
(Austl.). {Ex parte Johnson; re MacMillan (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 16 per Jordan CJ at
18.} “Authorise” has also been considered at length in the intellectual property
context and has been given a broad meaning. It has been held to mean to sanction,
approve, or countenance an infringing act. Univ. of N.S.W. v Moorhouse (1975) 133
CLR 1, 12 (Austl.) {University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1; 6
ALR 193)} (finding authorise traditionally had the meaning of “sanction, approve,
countenance”); Corp. of Adelaide v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1928) 40
CLR 481 (Austl.) {Corporation of the City of Adelaide v Australasian Performing
Right Assn Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481; [1928] ALR 127)} (finding authorise means “to
permit”). The courts have also held that authorization generally requires some
power to prevent the act, and some actual or constructive knowledge of the act;
however, express sanction or permission is not required. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd. v
iiNet Ltd. (2010) 263 ALR 215, ¶ 374–76 (Austl.) {Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet
Ltd (No 3) (2010) 263 ALR 215; 83 IPR 430; [2010] FCA 24}; Universal Music Austl.
Pty Ltd. v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 220 ALR 1, ¶ 365–66 (Austl.)
{Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR
1; 65 IPR 289; [2005] FCA 1242}.
155
See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at
30. {See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 30.}
156
Such duties may include the following: (1) the duty to act in the best
interests of the client, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B (Austl.) {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) 961B}; (2) the duty to give priority to the client’s interests, id. s 961J
{Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J}; (3) the duty to manage conflicts of interest, id.
s 912A(1)(aa) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 912A(1)(aa)}; and (4) the duty to provide
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The exemption does mean that advisers can still arrange for
clients to pay fees by deduction from their account without
infringing the ban. This fact is important as “dial up” adviser
service fee arrangements provided by product issuers could
otherwise be regarded as prohibited “commission” payments.
There may be difficulties in establishing the client-givenbenefit exemption in other circumstances. It is a significant
problem for licensees to remunerate advisers without infringing
the ban on conflicted remuneration. Traditionally, advisers have
received direct or indirect incentives based on the revenue
received by licensees from the adviser’s clients. This receipt does
not cause any particular difficulty where client fees are based on
hourly rates or flat fees for particular services which are not
linked to types of financial products.
However, many licensees and advisers charge clients on the
basis of funds under advice that is volume-based remuneration.
In recent times, this formulation is typically product neutral but
it may still incentivize an adviser to recommend that a client
invest funds in investments which count toward funds under
advice, as opposed to paying off debt or investing in other types of
investment.157 While it is possible to develop proxies for funds
under management that should not be conflicted remuneration,158
there are concerns in the industry that such measures mean that
adviser interests are not fully aligned with business success.
There is an irony in the balance between client “given” benefits
and volume-based benefits. It is possible for the client to agree to
pay licensees based on funds under advice—which would
otherwise be conflicted remuneration—but licensees may not be
able to pay a share of that remuneration directly to the adviser
who brought in these fees. One possibility may be to rely on the
client “given” benefit exemption. This reliance would involve
obtaining client agreement for both the fee paid to the licensee
and for a proportion of the fee to be paid to the adviser. While
financial services efficiently, honestly, and fairly, id. s 912A(1)(a) {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) s 912A(1)(a)}.
157
For example, funds under advice typically include managed funds,
superannuation, and shares—where the adviser is authorized to advise on shares.
They would not normally include real estate or less traditional forms of investment
such as artwork. It may not include certain bank account balances.
158
An example of such a proxy may be the client’s net wealth. This would be a
proxy for funds under advice as higher net worth clients are likely to have more
investments, and therefore more funds under advice.
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such an arrangement may appear unusual, it does seem
consistent with the purpose of the exemption to give the client
control over remuneration. And where a client does obtain such
control, remuneration is thus being designated as not conflicted.
This model does have some challenges.
Simply disclosing the form of remuneration to the client will
not be enough. It is clear that FOFA is intended to move beyond
a disclosure model to cure conflicts and is intended to ensure that
conflicted remuneration is permitted only where the client gives
that benefit, subject to other exemptions.
On the other hand, there does not seem to be any need for
the arrangement to be negotiable as such. It should be possible
for licensees and advisers to set the terms on which they will
provide services to clients. If the terms are not negotiable, the
client’s choice is whether to acquire the services on the terms
proposed.
It is easier to conclude that a client has directed that a share
of the licensee’s fee be paid to the client’s adviser where the share
is directly specified by the client. It may be harder to establish a
relevant “direction or clear consent” where the model is more
complex and the share of remuneration depends on other factors,
such as the level of remuneration generated by the adviser from
all clients or the compliance or quality of advice given.
As the focus of the exemption is on the individual client, it is
likely that the test is a subjective one for each particular client.
If so, the adviser and the licensee would need to be satisfied on
an individual basis that the client has “given” the benefit.
2.

Banking and Insurance Products

A number of different exemptions apply to banking and
insurance products which are mainly, but not entirely, carved out
of the prohibition on conflicted remuneration. They apply for a
variety of reasons. However, the government’s fear that such
exemptions will be misused has led to complex exemptions which
make it difficult for the industry to rely on them.
It is important firstly to recognize that the ban will not apply
to all financial products as that term would ordinarily be
understood. The financial services regime in Chapter 7 of the
Australian Corporations Act only applies to certain kinds of
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financial products and services, and in particular does not apply
to credit products, including home loans, personal loans, and
credit and charge cards.159
The FOFA Act provides the following product related
exemptions: (1) benefits given solely in relation to general
insurance;160 (2) monetary benefits given solely in relation to life
insurance, other than certain forms of life insurance available
through superannuation;161 (3) benefits given to banking
representatives solely in relation to basic banking products.162
These limitations appear designed to ensure they cannot be
taken advantage of to circumvent the general prohibition. This
approach is not particularly logical given the anti-avoidance
measure which has also been included in the regime, as
discussed below. It also means the exemptions are viewed as
impractical in many situations as most advisers advise on a
range of products.
The exemptions are cast very narrowly and it appears they
cannot be combined. This narrow approach to the exemptions
creates difficulties where advice is given on a number of topics or
where joint products are issued.163 The government responded to
159
“Financial product” and “financial service” are defined in divisions three and
four of the Corporations Act. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 763A, 766A (Austl.).
{Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 763A, 766A.} Credit facilities are excluded. Id.
s 765A(1)(h) {Ibid s 765A(1)(h)}; Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) reg 7.1.06
(Austl.) {Corporations Regulation 7.1.06}.
160
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963B(1)(a) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 963B(1)(a).}
161
Id. s 963B(1)(b). {Ibid s 963B(1)(b).} The exclusion does not apply to nonmonetary benefits, for which there is no explanation. However, the existing
FSC/FPA Industry Code of Practice on Alternative Forms of Remuneration in the
Wealth Management Industry applied to life insurance, so presumably the
government did not want to water down existing restrictions. See FIN. SERVS.
COUNCIL & FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, FSC/FPA INDUSTRY CODE OF PRACTICE ON
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF REMUNERATION IN THE WEALTH MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY 2
(rev. 2010).
162
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963D (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 963D.} “Basic banking product” includes most savings, transaction accounts, and
term deposits; associated non-cash payment facilities, such as check and payment
facilities; and traveler’s checks. Id. s 961F {Ibid s 961F}; see also id. s 761A {Ibid s.
761A} (defining “basic deposit account,” a type of basic banking product).
163
An important example is consumer credit insurance which, in Australia,
frequently comprises both a general insurance and a life insurance policy sold in
tandem. The Corporations Act provides that not only must access to or the amount
of the benefit be solely dependent on recommending a basic deposit product, but the
adviser, in the ordinary course of giving that advice, must not give advice on any
other financial product. Id. s 963D(c). {Corporations Act s 963D.}
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concerns regarding these exemptions by proposing further
exemptions.164 These proposals provide more flexible exemptions
for banking and insurance products,165 yet they still retain
restrictions which have the potential to artificially limit their
usefulness.
In particular, the new exemption for banking
products permits benefits relating to banking products, general
insurance, and non-financial products,166 but does not permit
advice to be given about any other product “at the same time.”167
This approach invites uncertainty about when an adviser can
advise a client on other products. Intermingled advice can
obviously not be given. However, questions remain as to whether
the same adviser can complete giving advice on a particular
product and then move on to giving advice on another product
without infringing the conflicted remuneration ban.
There is a problem for life insurance as a result of the
exclusion from the exemption of certain types of life insurance
made through superannuation.
This ban arises from the
government’s goal to prohibit commissions taken from
compulsory superannuation account balances, including in
relation
to
life
insurance
made
available
through
superannuation. After intense debate, the government agreed to
limit the ban to superannuation members who do not seek or
require advice on their superannuation insurance benefits. The
concern was that otherwise the regime would, in fact, create a
new conflict for advisers.168 The government has attempted to
address this problem by limiting the ban to default and group
insurance arrangements, but this attempt has not fully resolved
the industry’s concerns.169

164
Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) regs 7.7A.4.12,
7.7A.4.13 (Austl.). {Draft Corporations Regulations 7.7A.4.12 and 7.7A.4.13.}
165
For example, benefits relating to combined general and life insurance
products will be permitted. Id. reg 7.7A.4.12. {Draft Corporations Regulation
7.7A.4.12.}
166
This term is not defined but is understood to include loans.
167
Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) regs 7.7A.4.12,
7.7A.4.13 (Austl.). {Draft Corporations Regulations 7.7A.4.12 and 7.7A.4.13.}
168
As commission can be paid on life insurance acquired directly by clients,
different remuneration outcomes would arise depending on whether an adviser
recommends acquiring life insurance directly or through a superannuation fund.
169
This non-resolution is because group insurance arrangements through
superannuation can include both automatic cover and cover underwritten by the
insurer where, therefore, advisers are typically involved.
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Execution-Only Benefits

There is no need for an execution-only exemption where no
financial product advice is ever given to the client. This is
because conflicted remuneration is banned only where benefits
could reasonably be expected to influence advice. FOFA does not
apply to remuneration that influences investment decisions
where no advice is given.
Providers of retail investment
mandates or managed discretionary accounts, as they are known
in Australia,170 are only subject to the ban on conflicted
remuneration if they also provide retail advice. Furthermore, the
ban only applies to advisers and their licensee—it does not apply
to remuneration received by associates.171
However, there is a risk the ban could apply to licensee
remuneration where the licensee is responsible for both advice
and investment decisions. There are also concerns where an
adviser performs execution-only services for a client at a later
date.
FOFA addresses these concerns by including an exemption
where a benefit is given in relation to the issue or sale of a
financial product to a person by a licensee or representative and
no advice has been given about that product or similar products
by the licensee or representative in the twelve months before the
benefit is given.172 The government said the following of this
exemption:
This is proposed to avoid a situation where a licensee or
representative can never receive remuneration of an executiononly type if it has ever provided financial product advice to the
retail client. Where the financial product advice is remote with
respect to the issue or sale of the financial product—that is, it

170
AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REGULATORY GUIDE 179, MANAGED
DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNT SERVICES 3 (2004), available at http://www.asic.gov.au/
asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ps179.pdf/$file/ps179.pdf. {Australian Securities
and Investments Commission, Managed Discretionary Account Services, Regulatory
Guide 179, March 2004 (‘ASIC Regulatory Guide 179’) at 3.}
171
The duty to give priority to client interests requires advisers to place client
interests ahead of those of associates, but this duty also only applies “when giving
the advice.” Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J(1) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 961J(1).}
172
Id. s 963B(1)(c). {Ibid 963B(1)(c).}
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took place over 12 months before the issue or sale—it will not
deny the licensee or representative the benefit of paragraph
963B(c).173

This exemption applies only to the issue or sale of a product.
It does not apply to the acquisition, redemption, or variation of a
product.174
4.

Brokerage

Possibly in recognition of the limitations of the executiononly exemption, the government has proposed an exemption for
sharing brokerage fees175 with broker representatives. The
benefit must not be more than 100% of the brokerage fee, the
brokerage fee must be value-based, and the provider must be a
market participant and have anti-churning arrangements in
place.176
However, the proposed exemption has problems. First, it
applies only to representatives of market participants—it would
not, therefore, be possible to share brokerage fees with other
licensees or financial planners who refer clients to the broker.
Second, it applies only to brokerage fees calculated by reference
to the value of the product traded—however, dollar-based
brokerage fees can also be conflicted remuneration where they
may influence a recommendation to trade securities. Third,
there are concerns about the requirement for “anti-churning
arrangements,” which require arrangements to ensure that the
size or frequency of transactions entered into by a provider for a
retail client is appropriate, and that the provider takes into
account the investment objectives, financial situation, and needs
173
Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further Future of
Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth) para 1.11 (Austl.) (emphasis removed).
{Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to Corporations Amendment (Further
Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 tabled in the House of
Representatives, [1.11].}
174
The exemption will not, therefore, apply in the following circumstances:
(1) the purchase of a share on a stock exchange; (2) the redemption of a managed
fund or superannuation interest; and (3) the variation of a product, for example,
switching between investment options or increasing the sum insured.
175
“Brokerage fee” is defined as a fee based on the value of the product traded,
which is given by a retail client to a provider in consideration for the provider to
deal, on behalf of the retail client, in a financial product that is admitted for
quotation on a prescribed Australian or foreign financial market. Draft Corporations
Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.12(7) (Austl.). {Draft Corporations
Regulation 7.7A.4.12(7).}
176
Id. reg 7.7A.4.12(6). {Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.12(6).}
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of the client. As trades are often conducted in a no- or limited
advice context, it will be difficult for brokers to satisfy this
criteria.
5.

Stamping Fees

There is a proposed exemption from the ban on conflicted
remuneration for fees—known as “stamping fees”—paid by a
company to a financial services licensee or authorized
representative for raising capital or debt on its behalf.177 The
exemption is proposed to address concerns that the conflicted
remuneration ban would otherwise have an adverse impact on
the ability to raise capital in the Australian market. It has been
welcomed by industry, particularly as it is not limited to broker
representatives but extends to both “direct and indirect market
participants.”178
However, the proposal to restrict the exemption to companies
is unduly restrictive and would create anomalies in Australia’s
capital markets, leading to an inappropriate bias towards
corporate fundraising activities to the detriment of fundraising
activities relating to other types of entities, in particular, trust
structures. There is no tangible reason why the stamping
exemption should not apply to benefits given by other forms of
listed entities and there are many good commercial reasons why
a company is not the appropriate vehicle for a listed entity.179
The limitation appears to reflect a concern by the
government that permitting the exemption to apply to trusts,
which is the normal structure for managed funds in Australia,
would mean that the exemption could have unintended
consequences. However, the exemption is restricted to listed
entities, which would prevent its application to many investment
trusts.

177

Id. reg 7.7A.4.12(4). {Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.12(4).}
Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 30–
31. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 31, [2.29].}
179
It is common in Australia for property and infrastructure assets to be held
through a listed trust such as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”). The units of
such trusts may or may not be stapled to the units of another trust or the shares of
one or more companies, thereby becoming a “stapled security.”
178
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There is also a specific exemption for listed investment
companies,180 which could equally apply to listed trusts to achieve
the government’s apparent objective of excluding managed
investment schemes which primarily invest in other schemes or
securities. However, one problem with the proposed limitation is
that both listed companies and trusts invest in other financial
products in the form of securities and interests issued by
subsidiaries and special purpose vehicles. If read strictly, it
could mean that the exemption is rarely or never available.
6.

“Soft Dollar” Benefits

The ban on conflicted remuneration applies to both monetary
and non-monetary benefits.181
While some of the above
exemptions only apply to monetary benefits,182 the following
additional non-monetary benefits are permitted: benefits of less
than 300 AUD, provided identical or similar benefits are not
given on a frequent or regular basis;183 benefits which have a
genuine education or training purpose relevant to the provision
of financial product advice to retail clients—this purpose must be
the dominant purpose unless it is a training course, conference,
or seminar, in which case the lesser of seventy-five percent of the
time spent on the course or six hours a day must be spent on
educational or training activities for professional development,
and the participant or his or her employer must pay costs
relating to travel, accommodation, functions, and events;184 the
provision of information technology software or support related to
the provision of financial product advice to retail clients in
relation to the financial products issued or sold by the benefit
180
Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.12(5)
(Austl.) {Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.12(5)} (providing that the exemption
“does not apply if the company has the primary purpose of investing in financial
products”).
181
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 963A.}
182
The exemptions for life insurance, execution-only services, and brokerage
and stamping fees do not apply to non-monetary benefits.
183
See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963C(b) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 963C(b)}; Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.13
(Austl.) {Corporations Regulation 7.7A.13}; Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 33, at 24 {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory
Memorandum, above n 33, 24}.
184
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963C(c) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 963C(c)}; Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.14
(Austl.) {Corporations Regulation 7.7A.14.}.

FINAL_BATTEN & PEARSON

550

2/27/2014 6:25 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:511

provider185—the exemption only applies to product providers and
not generally to licensees responsible for advisers on the basis
that:
such benefits would not generally be provided in circumstances
where they could reasonably be expected to influence advice.
However, IT software and support benefits provided by
licensees will be prohibited if they could reasonably be expected
to influence advice, for example, where the benefit is provided
as a reward for product sales.186

These exemptions carry forward the existing exemptions in
the industry code of practice on alternative forms of
remuneration.187
They further demonstrate the theme of
replacing principles-based regulation with greater prescription as
the translation of this industry standard to statute has led to a
more restrictive regime for “soft dollar” benefits.188

185
Corporations Act 2011 (Cth) s 963C(d) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 963C(d).} The example provided of such a benefit is “the provision of software to
access a platform or access to a website to place orders.” Further FOFA Bill Revised
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 34. {Further FOFA Bill Revised
Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 34, [2.44].}
186
Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 34.
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 34, [2.45].}
187
See generally FIN. SERVS. COUNCIL & FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 161.
{FSC/FPA Industry Code of Practice on Alternative Forms of Remuneration in
the
Wealth
Management
Industry<http://www.fsc.org.au/downloads/file/FSC
Standards/14S_Jan_2010_JointCodeofPracticeonAlternativeformsofRemuneration.p
df> accessed 18 September 2012.}
188
In particular, the restrictions on education and training-related benefits
exemption seem to demonstrate the government’s distrust of the industry. There
was discussion of imposing further restrictions to limit the exemption to courses and
conferences in Australia or New Zealand, but free trade concerns seem to have
stayed the government’s hand so far. There are also concerns about the requirement
in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963C(c)(ii) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 963C(c)(ii)} that the benefit be “related to the provision of financial product advice.”
This requirement appears to preclude training relating to dealing activities or
general business management and development unless a broad view of “related to” is
taken.
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Shelf-Space Fee Ban

The legislation prohibits platform operators189 from accepting
“volume-based shelf-space fees.”190 A benefit is presumed to be a
volume-based shelf-space fee if the benefit, or its value, depends
wholly or partly on the total number or value of a product
issuer’s financial products to which the custodial arrangement
relates. The purpose of the ban is “to capture benefits provided
in return for a greater number or value of the funds manager’s
financial products about which information is to be included on
the platform.”191
There are exceptions if it is proved that all or part of the
benefit is either:
(a) a reasonable fee for a service provided to the funds manager
by the platform operator or another person”; [or]
(b) [a discount or rebate] the value of which does not exceed an
amount that may reasonably be attributed to efficiencies gained
by the funds manager because of the number or value of
financial products in relation to which the funds manager
provides services to the platform operator, or through the
platform operator to another person.192

While these exceptions have been welcomed by the industry,
they pose technical difficulties. The only service provided by a
platform operator is normally the right to be included on the
platform—hence the term “shelf-space fee.” This exception seems
either to be available only where other services are also provided,
or where the fee is “reasonable,” which presumably means
consistent with other such fees paid to other product issuers or
by other platform operators. However, the government states the
following:
189
These are products through which clients can acquire a range of other,
sometimes wholesale, products. Platforms are typically available to retail clients in
Australia only through financial planners. Commercially, platforms can be purely an
administrative arrangement or can include a custodial element where products are
held on trust for clients. The shelf-space fee ban only applies to the latter as a result
of the definition of custodial arrangement in section 964. While this term is typically
used for retail offers, the ban itself does not seem to be limited to such offers but
appears technically to apply to platforms available only to wholesale clients as well.
190
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 964A.}
191
Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 38.
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 68, [2.64].}
192
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964A(3) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 964A(3).}
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The Bill establishes a ban on the receipt by platform operators
of volume-based benefits to the extent that such incentives are
merely a means of product issuers or funds managers
‘purchasing’ shelf space or preferential positions on
administration platforms. However, the Bill does not purport to
ban fund managers lowering their fees to platform operators (in
the form of scale-based discounts or rebates) where such
discounts or rebates represent reasonable value for scale.193
....
In cases where the scale discount or rebate exceeds the
reasonable value of scale efficiencies, it is considered that the
benefit is intended to gain a placement on a platform or
preferential treatment on a platform (for example, a position on
a ‘model portfolio’ or ‘menu selection’).194

In relation to the second exception, it is not clear that most
product issuers do in fact gain any efficiencies by gaining access
to clients through platforms, except to the extent that it is
significantly cheaper to distribute products through platforms
than directly to clients. Quantifying such “efficiencies” is likely
to be challenging. The government simply indicates that “the
relative bargaining power between the particular funds manager
and the platform operator” can be taken into account.195
The ban only applies to platform operators accepting such
fees. It does not apply to the product issuer paying the fee.
F.

Ban on Charging Asset-Based Fees on Borrowed Amounts

There is a further important ban in the FOFA legislation.
As noted above, the collapse of Storm Financial and its financial
model was a significant reason for the introduction of the new
regime.196 There was evidence that clients were advised to
borrow significant sums, which were not appropriate to their
circumstances. As Storm Financial fees and the remuneration of
its advisers were based on funds under advice, there was a
significant incentive to recommend high levels of gearing by
clients.

193
Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 37.
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 37, [2.61].}
194
Id. at 38. {Ibid 38, [2.66].}
195
Id. {Ibid 38, [2.67].}
196
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Subsequent credit regulation has rectified the issue to some
extent by imposing an obligation on lenders to assess whether
the credit provided is not unsuitable for the client.197 However,
FOFA takes one step further by banning a licensee or
representative who provides retail advice—personal or general
advice—from charging an asset-based fee198 on a borrowed
amount used or to be used to acquire financial products by or on
behalf of the client.199
The ban will not apply if it is not reasonably apparent to a
prudent adviser200 that the amount has been borrowed.201 The
government gives the example of the client who deliberately
conceals the fact that the funds are borrowed.202 However, the
adviser remains responsible for making reasonable inquiries to
obtain complete and accurate information.203

197
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) pt 3-2, divs 3–4 (Austl.)
{National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Part 3-2, Divisions 3 and 4};
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 985EA–985K (Austl.) {Corporations Act Part 7.8,
Division 4A, Subdivision A}. However, these provisions apply to loans for personal,
domestic, household, or residential investment property purposes, and margin loans
respectively. Other investment loans are not currently regulated. National
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 5(3) (Austl.). {National Credit Code
s 5(3).} The government has issued a consultation paper which, among other things,
sought submissions on whether other types of investment loans should be regulated.
See THE TREASURY, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, NATIONAL CREDIT REFORM: ENHANCING
CONFIDENCE AND FAIRNESS IN AUSTRALIA’S CREDIT LAW—GREEN PAPER 49–56
(2010), available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1852/PDF/National_
Credit_Reform_Green_Paper.pdf. {‘National Credit Reform—Enhancing Confidence
and Fairness in Australia's Credit Law’ (Green Paper, July 2010).}
198
Asset-based fee is defined as “dependent upon the amount of funds used or to
be used to acquire financial products by or on behalf of” the client. Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) s 964F (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964A.}
199
Liability for breaching the ban attaches to the licensee where its
representative charges the fee, unless they are an authorized representative. Id.
ss 964D(2), 964E. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 964D(2), 964E.} Authorized
representatives are not normally employees of the licensee.
200
A prudent advisor is a person with a “reasonable level of expertise in the
subject matter of the advice” who exercises care and objectively assesses the
information. Id. s 964H {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964H}; Further FOFA Bill
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 39 {Further FOFA Bill
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 39, [2.73]}.
201
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 964D(3), 964E(2) (Austl.). {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) ss 964D(3), 964E(2).}
202
Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 39.
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 39, [2.73].}
203
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 964D(5), 964E(4) (Austl.). {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) ss 964D(5), 964E(4).}
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G. Grandfathering
Each of the elements of FOFA have their own
grandfathering measures.204
The regime for conflicted
remuneration is, however, currently very unclear.
The
legislation appears to grandfather any remuneration paid under
a remuneration arrangement entered into before commencement,
whether it relates to new or existing clients.205 Yet, there is
currently no grandfathering for payments made by platform
operators.206 There is a proposal to limit grandfathering so it
does not apply to investments made by new or existing clients
after the licensee’s FOFA commencement date;207 however, this
regulation is yet to be made. It is also understood that some
form of grandfathering will apply to payments by platform
operators, however this measure is yet to be released for
consultation.
The position regarding grandfathering is,
therefore, currently very unsatisfactory and significantly affects
the ability of industry to implement the necessary changes to
comply with FOFA.
V.

ONGOING FEE ARRANGEMENTS

The third limb of FOFA is regulation of ongoing fee
arrangements between advisers and clients.208
These
requirements come from a different direction than the conflicted
remuneration ban which is primarily about payments received by
advisers and licensees from product issuers and employers.209

204

In the case of the best interests duty, this grandfathering is very limited.
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1528–1529. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
ss 1528, 1529.} The ban on asset-based fees charged on borrowed amounts applies to
all fees charged after the licensee election date or July 1, 2013, whichever is later.
Id. s 1531. {Ibid s 1531.}
206
Id. s 1528(1)(b). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1528(1)(b).}
207
Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.16 (Austl.).
{Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.16.}
208
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.7A, div 3 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) Part 7.7A, Division 3.}
209
The main exception is the ban on charging asset-based fees on borrowed
amounts, which applies to both commission and client fee arrangements.
205
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The focus here is on arrangements where personal advice is
provided and fees are to be paid for more than twelve months.
This applies to a fee “however described or structured.”210 Oneoff fees and payment plans are not affected unless they form part
of an ongoing fee arrangement.211
This limb addresses remuneration received from clients,
although it may not be confined to this. The provisions do not
explicitly state whether they apply to fees received from other
parties or whether commissions and similar types of payments
can be viewed as “fees.” The language refers to “under the terms
of the arrangement, a fee . . . is to be paid,”212 without specifying
that the fee must be paid by the client rather than a third party
such as a product issuer. In any case, client “given” benefits,
which are exempt from the ban on conflicted remuneration, will
be subject to the ongoing fee arrangement obligations.
It is unclear whether this regulates trailing commissions,
which are undoubtedly arrangements for the payment of
remuneration for more than twelve months.
There are
arguments that they are not regulated as ongoing fee
arrangements.213

210
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 962A(1)(c), (2)(c) (Austl.). {Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) ss 962A(1)(c), 962A(2)(c).}
211
Id. ss 962A(1)–(3). {Ibid ss 962A(1)–(3).} While the regime only applies if the
arrangement includes a fee which is to be paid during a period of more than twelve
months, the disclosure obligations appear to apply to all fees payable under the
arrangement, including one-off fees and fees paid under a payment plan.
212
Id. ss 962A(1)(c), (2)(c). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 7.7A s 962A(1)(c),
962A(2)(c).}
213
An ongoing fee arrangement with a retail client is where a fee is to be paid
under the terms of the arrangement. Id. ss 962A(1), (2). {Ibid ss 962A(1), 962A(2).} A
trailing commission must be disclosed to the client who may agree to its receipt.
However, it is paid under an arrangement between the licensee or adviser and the
product issuer, and not under the arrangement with the client. Furthermore, the fee
disclosure statement only has to disclose fees “paid . . . by the client.” Id.
s 962H(2)(a). {Ibid s 962H(2)(a).} It is not clear whether this arrangement is in line
with the government’s view. While the Explanatory Memorandum does not refer to
commissions in relation to division 3, the Minister’s second reading speech stated
the following: “Some clients are unaware of the amount of [ongoing] fees and
continue paying them because they are disengaged. This scenario can arise both
where the advice fee is paid via a third party product commission, and directly from
the client to adviser.” Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13
Oct. 2011, 11797 (Bill Shorten, Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Financial
Services and Superannuation) (Austl.) (emphasis added).
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The following requirements apply to ongoing fee
arrangements: (1) clients must be provided with an annual fee
disclosure statement;214 (2) clients can opt out of the ongoing fee
arrangement at any time;215 (3) clients must be provided with a
renewal notice every two years;216 (4) the ongoing fee
arrangement will automatically terminate if the fee disclosure
statement or renewal notice requirements are not met217 or two
years and sixty days after the previous renewal notice, unless the
client actively renews the arrangement.218
A.

Fee Disclosure Statements

Fee disclosure statements must include the following: (1) the
amount of each fee paid by the client under the arrangement219 in
the previous year; (2) the amount of each fee that the current fee
recipient anticipates that the client will pay under the
arrangement in the next twelve months; (3) information about
the services that the client was entitled to receive from the
current and any previous fee recipient under the arrangement
during the previous year; and (4) information about the services
that the client actually received during the previous year.220 The
fee disclosure statements must be given within thirty days after
being prepared.221
B.

Renewal Notices

The renewal notice is required to contain the following
prescribed statements: (1) the client may renew the arrangement
by notifying the current fee recipient; (2) the arrangement will
214
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 962G (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 962G.}
215
Id. s 962E(1). {Ibid s 962E(1).}
216
Id. ss 962K, 962L. {Ibid ss 962K, 962L.}
217
Id. s 962F. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 962F.} Payment of a fee after
automatic termination does not waive the effect of non-compliance. However, the fee
recipient is not required to refund such a payment unless required by court. See id.
ss 962F(2)–(3), 1317GA. {Corporations Act 2001 ss 962F(2), 962F(3) and 1317GA.}
Charging a fee after the arrangement terminates for any reason is, however, a
breach of a civil penalty provision. Id. s 962P. {Ibid s 962P.}
218
Id. ss 962L(2), 962N. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 962L(2) and 962N.}
219
The provision uses the term “ongoing fee.” However, this term is defined as
any fee payable under an ongoing fee arrangement without specifying that the fee
must be paid over more than twelve months. Id. s 962B. {Ibid s 962B.}
220
Id. s 962H(2). {Ibid s 962H(2).}
221
Id. s 962H(1)(b)(i). {Ibid s 962H(1)(b)(i).}
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terminate, and no further advice will be provided or fee charged
under it, if the client does not elect to renew the arrangement;
and (3) the client will be taken to have elected not to renew the
arrangement if the client does not give the current fee recipient
notice in writing of an election to renew within thirty days after
the renewal notice and fee disclosure statement is given to the
client.222
A last minute amendment to the regime gave ASIC the
power to provide an exemption from the renewal notice obligation
and therefore the requirement for clients to opt-in every two
years where the fee recipient is bound by an ASIC-approved code
of conduct. ASIC will only approve a code for this purpose if
ASIC is satisfied “the code of conduct obviates the need for
persons bound by the code to be bound by the opt-in
requirement.”223
The inclusion of this provision in the legislation was
controversial and was thought at the time to favor certain
industry bodies over others.224
There has not been much
indication either at the time or subsequently of what such a code
will be required to contain. Speculation that ASIC would in any
case require a code to contain equivalent provisions initially
seemed misplaced based on the Minister’s statements at the time
the amendment was made.225 However, more recent statements
by ASIC suggest that this view may be correct.226
222

Id. s 962K(2). {Ibid s 962K(2).}
Id. s 962CA. {Ibid s 962CA.} ASIC is undertaking a review of REGULATORY
GUIDE 183, which sets out ASIC’s approach to approving codes of practice.
224
See, e.g., Press Release, Ass’n of Fin. Advisers, Tricky Politics Blight FOFA
Reform (Mar. 22, 2012). {For example, see Association of Financial Advisers, ‘Tricky
Politics Blight FOFA Reform’ (Media Release, 22 March 2012).}
225
The Minister, stating when tabling the amendment, that it “gives ASIC the
ability to exempt advisers from the opt-in obligation if they are satisfied that the
adviser has signed up to a professional code which obviates the need for opt-in.” Cth,
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 Mar. 2012, 4043 (Bill Shorten,
Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation and Minister for Employment
and Workplace Relations) (Austl.). {House Hansard, 22 March 2012, 4024.}
226
Peter Kell, Comm’r, Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, Speech at the
Association of Financial Advisers National Roadshow, Brisbane (July 26, 2012), in
ASIC’S FINANCIAL ADVISER WORK FOR 2012–13, at 10 {Australian Securities and
Investments Commissioner Peter Kell, ‘ASIC’s Financial Adviser Work for 2012–13’
(Speech delivered to the Association of Financial Advisers National Roadshow,
Brisbane, 26 July 2012)} (“As for ‘obviating the need’ for opt-in, we expect approved
codes to contain provisions that will achieve substantially the same outcomes as the
opt-in requirement intends to achieve. That is, we expect to see engaged clients who
receive agreed services for any ongoing fees that they pay.”).
223
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VI. ANTI-AVOIDANCE
The FOFA reforms introduce an anti-avoidance prohibition
which applies to the obligations in part 7.7A. Section 965 states
that a person must not enter into, begin to carry out, or carry out
a scheme for the sole purpose or for a purpose—that is not
incidental—of avoiding application of any provision of the new
part 7.7A of the Act, and the scheme has achieved this purpose.227
This anti-avoidance measure has some significant challenges
for the industry. It is very strict.228 The measure applies not
only to entering into or beginning to carry out a scheme but also
to carrying out the scheme.229 This application may mean that
steps taken before the commencement of FOFA may still be
impugned under section 965 if the scheme is carried out after
commencement.230
There are also concerns that structuring activities to fall
within an exemption may be enough to fall afoul of the
prohibition. This conclusion does not seem reasonable. However,
it demonstrates the uncertainty created by the provision,
particularly as it is possible to imagine circumstances where
structuring to fall within an exemption should be regarded as
avoidance.
It is also important to recognize that while some elements of
FOFA do not commence until the earlier of a licensee electing to
comply or July 1, 2013, the anti-avoidance measure commenced
on July 1, 2012. This means that while arrangements entered
into after July 1, 2012 may be legal currently, they may still
breach the anti-avoidance measure if a purpose is to avoid the
application of FOFA after July 1, 2013.

227

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 965 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

s 965.}
228
Extending the prohibition beyond sole or dominant purposes to nonincidental purposes makes this anti-avoidance measure stricter than the equivalent
tax anti-avoidance provision.
229
See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 965 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 965.}
230
The equivalent tax provision specifically carves out schemes entered into
before the commencement of the provision.
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CONCLUSION
The FOFA reforms are disappointing for both consumers and
the industry—although from different perspectives. Central to
both is the lack of clarity of a number of provisions. The problem
from a consumer protection perspective is to ensure that
intervention in the market forestalls the kinds of commissiondriven selling of inappropriate products and eventual collapse of
investment schemes.
Industry requires clarity so that it
understands its compliance obligations.
The public policy
imperative is to ensure that Australians are able to accumulate
and maintain savings and investments for retirement with
appropriate financial advice. The principle-based approach of the
unreformed legislation did not prevent market failures in the
advice industry and loss to individuals. The question is whether
the regulatory scheme was the cause and whether the FOFA
regime will do any better. By prescribing the steps that can be
followed to achieve the best interests of the client and by
prescribing priority to the client in the case of any client, the
legislation sets out a path towards good advice. Certain practices
are proscribed and banned. Advisers can no longer receive
conflicted remuneration. But we have seen that the lack of
clarity in these provisions means that although remuneration
models will change, the change may not be as radical as some
advocating for the retail client may have hoped.
The bottom line is that regulation is only as good as its
enforcement. ASIC has expressed concerns about its regulatory
powers and these concerns have been addressed. Prescriptive
and proscriptive regulation is generally perceived by regulators
as being easier to enforce than principle- or risk-based
regulation. However, no form of regulation will prevent market
failure or fraud. Prevention requires active, informed, and
empowered enforcement coupled with an effective regulatory
regime—one that is both flexible enough to respond to market
changes and specific enough to provide certainty. There is a
significant question whether Australia’s FOFA regime meets this
test.

